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pedic character and is far beyond the grasp of an
individual. On the other hand, the classical method
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 of organization according to logical structure exhibits
I. Dynamics of a single deductive system ...... 155
II. Intersystem dynamics . .... .... .. .. 158 the simplifying and unifying power of high-level
III. Logical integration . . . .. . . .. .. .. 160 abstractions. This feature presumably accounts for
IV. Mechanics, thermodynamics, and quantum
mechanics .................. 163 the appeal of classical physics, which endures even
A. Introduction ..... . . . . . . . . . 163 in the face of breakdowns and limitations.
B. Classical mechanics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
C. From thermodynamics to quantum mechanics. Of course, the unifying power of the classical logi-
Quasistatics ................ 166 cal structure is severely limited. The difficulties stem
D. Dynamics of structures . 178
E. Physics of organisms . . 182 primarily from the fact that this structure centers
V. Philosophical Reflections .... ....... 183 around Newtonian mechanics as the basic discipline.
The situation was characterized by Einstein asINTRODUCTION follows:
HE systematization of the theories of physics "In spite of the fact that, today, we know posi-
can be attempted along two different lines. A tively that classical mechanics fails as a foundation
classification is either based on the logical conceptual dominating all physics, it still occupies the center of
structure, or else follows the pattern of classification all of our thinking in physics. The reason for this
of the objects that are of principal interest in the lies in the fact that, regardless of important progress
theory. reached since the time of Newton, we have not yet
The most important example of the first procedure arrived at a new foundation of physics concerning "
is provided by late 19th century physics which is which we may be certain that the manifold of all
divided into mechanics, electrodynamics, and ther- investigated phenomena, and of successful partial
modynamics. This logical structure, and particularly theoretical systems, could be deduced logically from
the program of ultimate unification by reduction to it."
classical mechanics, was shattered by the crisis that During the quarter of a century that elapsed since
marked the transition from classical to modern phys- Einstein wrote these lines, the discrepancy between
ics. At any rate, the practical needs of contemporary the classical mechanical thinking and the formal
research shifted the emphasis to the second of the development of physics has further increased. At the
abovementioned methods of systematization, within same time there is no decisive advance in the emer-
which one speaks of the physics of elementary parti- gence of a new comprehensive foundation that can
cles, nuclei, molecules, fluids, solids, plasma, and be accepted with assurance.
stars (to mention only some of the most important The purpose of this paper is to describe a new
divisions). Further subdivisions have been considered technique of logical analysis that is to bring about a
which depend on the expanding range of knowledge. more harmonious relation between conceptual think-
Thus, one has not only the physics of semiconductors ing and formal developments. However, this is to be
and masers, but also the physics of elementary parti- achieved within a program the scope of which is
cles in various ranges of energy. much more modest and manageable than the one
Both methods of organization satisfy specific and hinted at by Einstein.
important needs. On the one hand, the classification We propose to sort out and improve the logical
by objects of interest is indispensable for making structure of the existing, empirically verified theories.
specialized knowledge possible. However, the totality The establishment of a new foundation is the ex-
of physics presented in this fashion has an encyclo- pected outcome rather than the prerequisite of this
* Supported in part by the U. S. Army Signal Corps, the procedure
Air Force Office of Scientific Research, and the Office of Naval
Research; and in part by the U.S. Air Force (Office of Scien- 1 A. Einstein, J. Franklin Inst. 221, 349 (1936). Reprinted
tific Research, Air Research and Development Command) in A. Einstein, Ideas and Opinions (Crown Publishers, Inc.,
under Contract AF49(638)-95. New York, 1954), p. 300.
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The problem is to take advantage of the use of
high-level abstractions while minimizing the risks
inherent in their use. Successful abstractions have a
predictive value of unexpected scope that greatly
exceeds the range of their original empirical founda-
tion. This situation often produces an unjustified
confidence in the absolute validity of the theory. Yet
not even the most perfect agreement between theory
and experiment, extending over a wide range, pro-
vides a guarantee against the appearance of an essen-
tial disagreement as the range of experience is ex-
tended even further. The resolution of such disagree-
ments may require the reconceptualization even of
those theories that have been confirmed by experi-
ment.
As a protection against the ossification of success-
ful theories, we propose to make the connection
between basic assumptions and experimental pre-
dictions sufficiently manifest, in order to facilitate a
continued readjustment of the basic assumptions to
the expanding range of experience. The use of de-
ductive systems is an important device for achieving
this goal.
The basic disciplines of classical physics are indeed
organized as deductive systems. However, during the
19th century when the three major classical disci-
plines assumed their definitive form, the nature of
deductive systems was still very incompletely under-
stood.
The modern conception of deductive systems to be
used in this paper is in some of its main aspects
diametrically opposed to the classical one. Tradition-
ally, deductive systems are used to organize knowl-
edge that is already well substantiated. It is deemed
essential to start from a basis that is safe from any
emergency that might call for its revision. Of course,
the origin of this reliable basis was an ever unsolved
mystery. For existing systems that have been ac-
cepted as entirely dependable, the problem seems to
be merely a recondite philosophical quest for the
justification of something about which there is no
real doubt anyway. However, in the present state of
physics the problem of foundations manifests itself
in the painful absence of a dependable starting point
for developing important theories of practical in-
terest.
Accordingly, the present effort is directed mainly
toward the clarification of the problem of foundation.
We shall attempt neither to justify the traditional
foundations, nor to advance any new foundations
on the basis of a priori plausibility. The method to be
used is the explicit recognition and the systematic
improvement of the logical structure that is implicit
in the existing experimentally supported theories.
We abandon the traditionally static, not to say
dogmatic, relation between postulational basis and
system. In the present approach the basis is tentative
and subject to change if this leads to an improvement
of the system in accounting for experimental facts.
This feedback from system to basis leads to the dy-,
namic, evolutionary adjustment of the system to a
widening range of experience. Instead of assuming
that deductive systems have to be perfect in order'
not to collapse, the present method of analysis deals
with imperfect systems. In fact, one of the tasks of
the method is to locate and eliminate imperfections.
In view of this situation, we shall refer to this method
as dynamic logical analysis, or the dynamics of de-
ductive systems.
Section I of this paper contains a survey of the
dynamic principles for the construction of deductive
systems. These principles are not new, they have
been developed in great detail in mathematical logic,
and the empirical aspects of deductive systems have
been investigated within logical positivism. The
novelty of our presentation is therefore only a matter
of selection and emphasis, and, last but not least, the
contention, and, we hope, the demonstration that
these principles are of practical use.
The actual construction of physically relevant de-
ductive systems along these lines is, of course, a
rather tedious enterprise. However, two instances
have been actually produced thus far. First, the
macroscopic thermodynamics of equilibrium,2 briefly
MTE, and the statistical thermodynamics of equi-
librium,3 briefly STE.
The axiomatizations of these well-known theories
demonstrates the fact that the application of modern
logical principles leads to a considerable restructur-
ing-even of classical disciplines that seemed to have
assumed a fairly rigid pattern.
It is an important insight of mathematical logic
that each deductive system contains primitive con-
cepts that cannot be defined by conventional means,
but are implicitly defined by the deductive system as
a whole. This "definition by postulation" of primi-
tives, so important in modern mathematics, will be
shown to be valuable also in physics. While recogniz-
ing the basic identity of the method in both disci-
plines, one should also take note of a difference stem-
ming from the fact that the deductive systems of
physics are always supplemented by rules of corre-
spondence which establish a link with experience.
Mainly as a consequence of this connection, most
2 L. Tisza, Ann. Phys. (N. Y.) 13, 1 (1961).
3 L. Tisza and P. M. Quay (to be published).
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concepts of physics evoke in the mind images or
models, for which the postulates are presumably true
statements. Although this intuitive aspect of the
abstract concepts of physics is important for many
reasons, the relations between experiment, intuitive
models, and deductive systems are intricate, not
,unique, and hard to state in precise terms. The
method of definition by postulation is an effective
tool for clarifying the semantic ambiguities that arise
out of this situation.
The fact that primitive concepts assume a precise
meaning only relative to the deductive system into
which they are incorporated, can be aptly referred
to as the relativity of concepts.
An apparent difficulty for the deductive method
is that most of the basic disciplines, say classical
mechanics, thermodynamics, quantum mechanics,
are too ramified and diverse to be compressed within
the confines of a rigorously built deductive system.
We propose to overcome this difficulty by construct-
ing a cluster of deductive systems, even for repre-
senting one basic discipline.
Since, as we have pointed out, each deductive
system implicitly defines its own set of primitive
concepts, the increase in the number of systems is
tantamount to an increase in the number of funda-
mental concepts that are defined relative to a par-
ticular context specified in terms of a deductive
system. For this reason, we designate the procedure
leading to a collection of deductive systems as logical
differentiation.
The conceptual wealth brought about by the
method of logical differentiation provides us with
all the freedom we may need to adjust our deductive
systems to a variety of experimental situations.
However, if the analysis should stop at this point,
one might feel that the freedom in the formation of
deductive systems has been carried too far, since it
seems to lead to a proliferation of basic concepts.
Actually, however, this process is held in check by
the second stage of our procedure, the logical integra-
tion of deductive systems. This is a procedure which,
to our knowledge, is advanced here for the first time.
The problem of logical integration arises from the
methodological postulate that the various deductive
systems are to express various aspects of the same
reality. The reference to "reality" is apt to provoke
queries of a philosophical nature. However, for the
purposes of this paper it is satisfactory to interpret
the statement above simply as follows. The separa-
tion of phenomena into "mechanic," "electric,"
"thermodynamic," etc., each described in terms of
several deductive systems, is an abstraction. Real
phenomena exhibit all of these aspects at once, and
the various deductive systems should be applicable
in conjunction with each other, and hence should be
compatible.
The program of logical integration, pursued by
ensuring compatibility or mutual consistency of
deductive systems, is the central issue of this paper.
In Sec. II we examine the logical requirements
under which two systems, strictly speaking incon-
sistent with each other, can nevertheless be made
compatible for empirical purposes. In this procedure
we assign a central role to a simple relation that is the
prototype for such relations that exist, say, between
relativistic mechanics (RM) and classical mechanics
of particles (CMP), or quantum mechanics (QM)
and CMP. Here and in what follows, the capitalized
abbreviations refer to deductive systems, and are
explained in the block diagram (Fig. 1). This diagram
represents the integrated system of the major deduc-
tive systems of physics, obtained by the repeated
application of our fundamental relation. We note
that this relation is asymmetric: In an appropriate
limiting case one of the systems, to be called dominant
or fundamental, reduces to the derivative system. The
trend towards the integration of the existing deduc-
tive systems can be conceived of as the driving force
leading to such highly abstract and fundamental
systems as RM and QM. In this integration process,
the arbitrariness in the selection of single deductive
systems is drastically reduced. It appears that taking
cognizance of the relative character of concepts is the
prerequisite for establishing increasingly objective and
unique integrated logical structures.
We shall refer to the doctrine that calls for the
establishment of such structures as are represented
in Fig. 1 as integrated or consistent pluralism.
The problem of logical integration does not arise
in mathematics. Even though some of the deductive
systems are related to each other, in general, each
deductive system of mathematics constitutes a uni-
verse of discourse of its own. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that the intersystem relation of Sec. II has not
been discussed in mathematical logic.
We consider now the relation of our method of
logical integration to that which is implicit in classical
physics. The classical method of integration has a
monistic character: The consistency of physics is
achieved by singling out one of the existing deductive
systems as "fundamental," while all other systems
are considered "phenomenological," to be "justified"
by reduction to the fundamental system. The con-
cepts of the latter are the only ones directly related
to "physical reality." Problems, which seem to play
_I _____ 1__. ___1F~1- .-. ·i^··IIP111-i·l···I-LYi-·I··II 11--1
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a key role in the reduction of phenomenological
systems to the fundamental one, are accorded the
status of fundamental problems.
From the time of Newton until the end of the
19th century the fundamental deductive system was
assumed to be classical mechanics. The ideal monistic
organization of physics was mechanistic. As the
shortcomings of classical mechanics became evident,
unified field theory and quantum mechanics were
supposed to play the same fundamental role.
Although the monistic philosophy stimulated many
brilliant achievements and scored interesting partial
successes, the idea was never more than a program,
its ultimate feasibility a matter of metaphysical
conviction.
The monistic mechanistic metaphysics was indeed
criticized from the positivist empiricist point of view.
It was pointed out in essence that: (a) There is no
reason why an expanding range of experience should
be reducible to a system distilled from past experi-
ence, and (b) the narrowness of the alleged funda-
mental system is in striking contrast with the con-
ceptual wealth of the systems to be reduced.4
The suggested alternative is the positivist, or
operational method, according to which, abstract
concepts should be introduced only if directly
anchored in experimental operations. This pro-
cedure, at least in its more extreme versions, would
discourage the introduction of high-level abstractions
for the consistent organization of a wide range of
experience. The positivist approach played an im-
portant liberating role in stimulating the develop-
ment of modern physics along lines which were incon-
sistent with the mechanistic logical structure.
Nevertheless, operationalism has its unsatisfactory
aspects. It leads to a highly fragmented state of
physics that could be aptly described as eclectic,
nonintegrated pluralism. Moreover, a close adherence
to the operational principle is no more feasible than
a strict adherence to the mechanistic organization.
Actually, the practice of physics, at present, is an
uneasy compromise between monistic unity and the
diversity of eclectic pluralism. The exact nature of
this compromise eludes precise formulation.
Even a most cursory inspection reveals that our
integrated pluralism differs in essential respects from
all versions of nonintegrated pluralism, and also from
the classical monistic structure, although the differ-
ence is more subtle. It is possible, and the author
4 The second argument is, at present, entirely obvious if the
fundamental system is classical mechanics or unified field
theory. The case of quantum mechanics is more subtle and we
shall return to it in Sec. IV.
finds it most likely, that the procedure of logical
differentiation and integration will ultimately lead
to a single system that dominates all other systems.
Even if this conjecture should turn out to be correct,
the present situation is very different from the one
postulated in the monistic view according to which
we are already in possession of the most fundamental
deductive system. The present method has an open-
ended character, greatly in contrast with the tradi-
tional idea of the deductive method, according to'
which everything is implicit in the already available
basis. In a certain sense we are dealing with an in-
verse deductive method. Starting from the experi-
mentally tested low-level abstractions, we search for
the basis from which the former can be derived.
The first two sections of the paper are written in a
manner which, we hope, is detailed enough to con-
vey a reasonably definite idea of the logical equip-
ment which we propose to use. The remainder of the
paper is devoted to applications of this equipment.
Since the potential scope of these applications seem
to be quite extensive, our account of it is necessarily
sketchy, it merely prepares the ground for further
elaborations.
The applications can be, by and large, grouped
into two categories; The first is only a better system-
atization of existing knowledge, whereas the second
leads to genuinely new results. Although traditional
logical analysis was brought to bear only on the first
type of problem, in the present approach the two are
closely related to each other.
As a first step we have a crude systematization of
the major systems of physics represented in the block
diagram of Fig. 1. The blocks symbolizing theories
are connected by various symbols representing the
logical relations defined in the first two sections.
Strictly speaking, these symbols have a precise
meaning only if the theories are represented in terms
of reasonably rigorous deductive systems. Generally
speaking, this condition is not satisfied, but some of
the theories, say, those related to classical fields, are
so well organized, that a more rigorous axiomatiza-
tion is unlikely to affect the situation substantially.
For cases of this sort, the block diagram can be con-
sidered as a table of contents for a novel type of
encyclopedia of theoretical physics. Also, the first
three sections should provide sufficient instructions
for the specialist who might wish to axiomatize his
own field of interest. The requirements of mutual
consistency provides certain "boundary conditions"
for this endeavor, but conversely he might generalize,
widen, and certainly enrich the block diagram itself.
Clearly, the latter does not constitute a rigid "grand
154
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scheme" that one would have to accept in its totality
at the outset.
A particularly interesting case falling into the
second category is thermodynamics. Recently two
axiomatizations of this discipline were developed, the
first, MTE, leads to a restructuring of the macro-
scopic theory,2 the second, STE, to an extension into
the statistical domain.3 It is our contention that
implicit in these theories is a conception of the struc-
'ture of matter that is in a way complementary to the
mechanistic one implicit in CMP. At least poten-
tially, this conception seems to be more microscopic
than the mechanistic one and provides a more satis-
factory transition to quantum mechanics than the
historical path emphasizing the connection with
CMP. The substantiation of these claims is, of
course, a very extensive project the outline of which
is contained in Sec. IV. The details are being de-
veloped in a series of papers, of which references 2
and 3 are the first two. At this point, we advance two
remarks that might serve to explain our statement to
some extent. CMP can be conceived as the conceptu-
alization of astronomy, a macroscopic observational
discipline, while thermodynamics is the conceptuali-
zation of chemistry, an experimental discipline deal-
ing with structural transformations. The mathe-
matical equipment of CMP is essentially the theory
of differential equations, that of thermodynamics is
mathematical statistics. To insert statistical elements
into differential equations has a disruptive effect on
the formalism. This seems to have been the reason
for Einstein's objections to the statistical aspects of
quantum mechanics. In contrast, differential equa-
tions may appear as limits of stochastic difference
equations and can also be inserted in other ways into
mathematical statistics. Hence this change in point of
view opens up the possibility of a constructive solu-
tion of the famous Einstein-Bohr controversy. 5 In
particular, we shall formulate a second principle of
causality that is characteristic of the thermodynamic
theories and that is in contrast to the traditional
mechanistic principle.
The switch from differential equations to mathe-
matical statistics profoundly affects the type of
questions that have to be admitted as legitimate in
physics. Whereas it is traditionally emphasized that
quantum mechanics restricts the range of measure-
ments that were thought to be possible within
CMP, it has not been brought out that quantum
mechanics renders many real measurements possible
5 Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, edited by P. A.
Schilpp, (The Library of Living Philosophers, Evanston,
Illinois, 1949).
that were not even conceivable within the classical
theories. It is apparent from these remarks that the
present point of view is not without its philosophical
implications. A few of these we shall discuss in Sec. V.
I. DYNAMICS OF A SINGLE DEDUCTIVE SYSTEM
Deductive systems play a central part in the forth-
coming discussion and we shall first summarize their
properties, to the extent that these are relevant for
our purposes.
A deductive system is a structure of concepts and
propositions ordered according to the following prin-
ciples. Complex concepts are explained in terms of
simpler ones and, in the last analysis, the whole
conceptual structure is derived from a few primitive
concepts, or briefly, primitives. Definitions of this sort
will be denoted as synthetic definitions. Similarly,
complex propositions or theorems are inferred from
simpler ones and are finally anchored in postulates.
The primitive concepts and postulates of the
system will be briefly referred to as its basis or foun-
dation. The basis has to be supplemented by rules
governing the derivation of theorems and the formu-
lation of synthetic definitions. In some respects a
deductive system can be considered as a language;
the aforementioned rules constitute its grammar.
The experimental relevance of the deductive sys-
tems of physics is conveyed by rules of correspondence
or coordination that establish a relation between the
conceptual elements on the one hand, and the objects
of our common experience on the other. In general,
the rules of coordination relate substantial parts of
several deductive systems to extensive classes of
measurements. It is seldom, if ever, possible to pro-
vide a convincing and direct experimental proof of
the postulational basis.
In principle, we have to specify also the disciplines
preceding the one under consideration, which are to
be used freely. For the systems of physics, parts of
logic and mathematics are such prior disciplines.
However, these need not be explicitly listed for the
current discussion.
We shall call the sequence of steps connecting the
basis with a theorem a logical chain, or briefly, a
chain. Symbolically,
T[C;P;D]
denotes a theorem T derived from the postulates P
and involving the primitive concepts C, through the
intermediary of a specified sequence of steps con-
stituting a derivation D.
The logical content of the formula T[C;P;D] can
be expressed as follows: The theorem T is at least as
____IIC_ _1II___ _sll·l_ _ __IYI__IIII1__YYL1__11_-1-
_ _ _ 
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true as the postulates entering its argument. In other
words, the acceptance of P implies the acceptance of
T, but the converse is not true. It is often possible
to prove the same theorem within different systems.
In discussing systems as a whole we can take one
of two possible attitudes symbolically represented in
the following formulas:
S = S{C;P} , (1.1)
and
S = S{C;P;D} , (1.2)
respectively. We shall refer to (1.1) as the logical
composition of the system. It contains the entire basis
that generates the system, whereas in a chain we
insert only those concepts and postulates that are
necessary for the completion of the proof. In princi-
ple, the basis determines the complete logical potenti-
alities of the system, and formula (1.1) expresses the
important fact that the basis is, in a way, the nucleus
that succinctly contains the entire system, which is
often too extensive to be apprehended otherwise.
Evidently, deductive systems contribute most
effectively to the economy of thought. Yet one should
not lose sight of the fact that statements about the
potentialities of a system have often a speculative
character. It is not always obvious whether persistent
difficulties of solving a problem are only of a techni-
cal-mathematical nature, or whether they stem from
the inadequacy of the basis.
Therefore, in a more conservative vein, it is some-
times useful to refer to a system in terms of Eq. (1.2).
In other words to consider the system as the col-
lection of theorems that has actually been derived at
a particular stage of the historical development.
The construction of a deductive system essentially
consists of the selection of the basis and the deriva-
tion of chains leading from the basis to theorems
which, in turn, are related to observations. Thus,
three distinct fields are open for logical analysis. The
first pertains to the origin of the chains and consists
of the evaluation and justification of the basis; the
second is concerned with the rules for the derivation
of the chains from a given basis, while the third deals
with the rules of coordination that relate the end
points of the chains to experiments. Of the three
possible lines of inquiry, we shall be concerned here
with only the first.
The second line of study deals with the routine
operations of deriving theorems from a fixed basis.
This corresponds to the conventional idea of the
"deductive method." We need not enter into the dis-
cussion of this aspect of the problem, partly because
it has been thoroughly investigated within traditional
logic, and partly because the standards of formal
rigor emerging from these discussions are actually too
high for the purposes of physics. For these purposes,
the use of a reasonably precise mathematical formal-
ism seems amply sufficient.
Although the third type of study, pertaining to
the rules of coordination, is of considerable interest,
we shall not enter into its discussion now. The rules
of coordination are of a subtle nature; they contain'
abstract concepts on the one hand, and terms de-
scribing apparatus and objects of our common experi-
ence on the other. The disentangling of these various
ingredients involves difficult epistemological prob-
lems. The more one ponders about these matters, the
more surprising it seems how well these problems are
handled in actual practice. However interesting it
might be to clarify the logical basis of this highly
intuitive activity, it seems unlikely that such a
logical analysis could be of any real help to the
experimental physicist at the present time.
The case for logical analysis is much more favora-
ble when we turn to the first of the above mentioned
problems and inquire into the meaning of the bases of
deductive systems and the justification of their selec-
tion in preference to other possibilities.
In the discussion of the basis, the first problem to
be considered is the clarification of the meaning of
primitive concepts. Forming the point of departure
for the synthetic definition of complex concepts, bar-
ring circularities, primitives cannot be defined in
terms of even simpler concepts. Thus arises the
paradoxical situation that the most important con-
cepts of physics, or of any other science for that
matter, cannot be defined along traditional lines.
The current attitude with respect to the paradox of
undefinable concepts varies widely. Perhaps, the
most frequent procedure is to cover up the difficulties
by pseudo-definitions that fail to convey any precise
meaning. At the other extreme is acceptance of the
difficulty as inherent in the situation."
There have also been attempts to explain the
meaning of primitives in terms of "operational
definitions," or rules of coordination. This program
was never actually carried out in detail. In the
author's opinion, the difficulties encountered are of a
fundamental nature. The primitives form the begin-
ning of the chains, while the connection with experi-
6 "My own pet notion is that in the world of human thought
generally, and in physical science particularly, the most im-
portant and most fruitful concepts are those to which it is im-
possible to attach a well-defined meaning." H. A. Kramers,
Motto of Collected Scientific Papers (North-Holland Publishing
Company, Amsterdam, 1956).
*
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ment occurs at the end points. We clearly have two
problems: the meaning of the primitives, and the
experimental verification of the theorems. The power
of experiment in deciding among competing assump-
tions will be greatly increased if the meaning of these
assumptions is clear.
We propose to solve the problem of primitives by
using the method of "definition by postulation" that
is widely practiced in mathematics. According to this
procedure, primitive concepts remain undefined in
the synthetic sense, but their use is specified in terms
of the postulates of the deductive system of which
they are the ingredients. In fact, these postulates
provide the instructions for the use of the primitives
in forming the chains, and hence the observable
prediction of the system.
Thus the precise meaning of the "undefined"
primitive concepts is contained implicitly in the
entire deductive system symbolically represented by
its "formula" S = S{C;P}. We shall refer to this
formula as the analytic definition of the concepts C.
Of course, we cannot expect a system to define a
satisfactory set of concepts unless the formalism of
the system is consistent.
The method of analytical definition is undoubtedly
very abstract and is usually supplemented by the
introduction of ideal objects, or intuitive "models"
used as the interpretations of the primitive concepts.
In this interpretation the postulates have to be true
statements. Such intuitive notions are very useful
and are instrumental in suggesting the experimental
methods for the verification of the theory. Neverthe-
less, this use of models has many pitfalls. Their
meaning is often not as clear as one might wish, and
models that are intuitively accepted, or at least
favored, are often oversimplified as compared with
the theory to be interpreted.
In the presence of such difficulties, falling back on
the method of analytic definitions may be the only
recourse. In this way, we can establish the precise
meaning of such concepts as "space," "time," "parti-
cle," etc. The problem of defining these by conven-
tional means is complicated by the fact that these
terms are currently used in the context of different
deductive systems, such as classical, relativistic, and
quantum mechanics. The method of analytic defini-
tions makes it evident that the meaning of words
denoting primitive concepts undergoes substantial
changes as the context changes from one deductive
system to another, or even as a deductive system is
modified under the impact of expanding experience.
Analytic definitions are most appropriate for han-
dling these semantic difficulties which are quite
baffling on the level of verbal arguments. It appears
that primitive concepts have a definite meaning only
relative to a particular context characterized with pre-
cision by a deductive system and its formula.
We now turn to the problem of the justification of
the postulational basis. First of all, we recognize that
the basis is hypothetical, selected on intuitive
grounds without any claim of a priori justification.
Being arbitrary, the basis is not unique and there are
in general several competing possibilities to account
for the same class of phenomena. The relative merits
of the various bases are evaluated a posteriori on the
strength of the system generated by them. While the
theorems within a system are justified by reduction
to the basis, this situation is now reversed and the
basis is justified by the system as a whole. If need
arises, the basis is improved by feedback coupling
from the developed system. Thus the circularity of
reasoning, carefully eliminated from the intrinsic
structure of the system, reappears "in the large" in
the dependence of the basis on the system as a
whole. This circularity is not "vicious," and can be
handled to great advantage for the improvement of
the system.
Concordance with experiment is of overriding im-
portance for the evaluation of deductive systems.
We shall not even consider systems unless concord-
ance with experiment is ensured for a significant
range.7 Nevertheless, this empirical requirement is
not sufficient by itself. The main reason is that the
same experimental facts can be conceptualized in
radically different ways, and we need criteria for
selecting among the various possibilities.8 The prob-
lem is to identify those highly abstract concepts that
are most effective in creating order within the chaos
of raw experimental facts, described in terms of low-
level abstractions. In order to facilitate such judg-
ments, it is desirable to have criteria for deciding in
an objective fashion whether, and to what an extent
a theory is fundamental, phenomenological, ad hoc, or
merely an instance of curve fitting. It is also desirable
that these criteria be more specific than a requirement
of "simplicity."
Although we cannot expect to establish hard and
fast rules for deciding such questions, we shall arrive
7 Concordance is not an absolute concept, but is relative to a
certain range. A further discussion of this point is found in the
next section.
8 This can be made plausible in terms of the following simple
example. A finite portion of a plane can, within finite accuracy,
be approximated by an infinite variety of surfaces of small
curvature. Hence, plane geometry can be replaced for em-
pirical purposes by an infinity of Riemannian geometries. This
argument is easily adjusted to other deductive systems such
as classical mechanics.
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at workable criteria from the examination of the
logical structure of the theories. This structure is
evaluated in terms of such basic properties as the
consistency, independence, and comprehensiveness of
the axioms. We note that in virtue of formula (1.1)
we can make such statements equally well about the
basis and about the system. Moreover, these proper-
ties arise both in intrasystem and intersystem rela-
tions. The latter are of particular importance for the
purposes of this paper.
If two chains have been found within a deductive
system, one of which is the assertion, the other the
negation of the same theorem, we are faced with an
inconsistency. A system is consistent if it contains
no inconsistency. The negative character of this
definition renders the branch of mathematical logic
dealing with the scope and limitations of proofs of
absolute consistency extremely difficult.
Therefore, we hasten to point out that we shall
accept the consistency of dependable deductive sys-
tems without known inconsistencies on pragmatic
grounds. Our concern will be a much more managea-
ble problem, the mutual consistency of two systems to
be considered in the next section.
We turn now to the discussion of the independence
of the postulates.
Let us suppose that a logical chain is discovered
connecting a statement Po, formerly believed to be a
postulate, with the rest of the postulates: Po[C,P].
In such a case we say that Po is dependent on the rest
of the basis. If it is impossible to find such a chain,
Po is independent.
It is seen that dependence is as tangible a relation
as inconsistency, whereas independence shares the
elusiveness of consistency. Economy requires that
various postulates of a deductive system be inde-
pendent of each other. However, under static con-
ditions the dependence of an axiom on the rest of the
basis is an esthetic flaw rather than a serious defect.
The situation is different under dynamic condi-
tions. In the case of imperfect systems it is important
to know that certain postulates are independent of
each other and can be independently rejected or re-
tained as the system is revised.
The problem of independence is particularly inter-
esting as an intersystem relation. The question to be
decided is whether or not one deductive system is
reducible to another.
Another important property of a postulational
basis is its comprehensiveness. By this we mean the
explicit formulation of all of the essential assumption
actually involved in the development of the system.
The application of the criterion of comprehensive-
ness clearly involves an important element of judg-
ment. Comprehensiveness can be overdone and the
proliferation of trivial postulates could degenerate
into hair splitting. A positive sign that the addition
of a heretofore hidden assumption to the basis is
worthwhile, is obtained if the denial or modification
of the postulate in question generates a new and
interesting system. Significant examples of this sort
were demonstrated by Hilbert9 who found that'
Euclid's axiomatization of geometry is not compre
hensive. He proved the independence and significance
of the additional axioms by developing consistent
geometries in which these postulates are negated.10
We shall see in Sec. IV that the situation is some-
what similar in thermodynamics. The new develop-
ment of the subject is brought about by modification
of postulates that were not explicitly formulated in
the classical theory.
II. INTERSYSTEM DYNAMICS
The dynamic interaction between a deductive
system and its foundation leads to occasional revision
of the latter. Often the revised system is in every re-
spect superior to the earlier one, and completely
replaces it in the living structure of physics.
However, there arise situations in which the old
system cannot be dismissed as a historic relic, but
has to be used along with the improved system. The
joint use of different deductive systems for describing
different aspects of reality raises novel problems of
logical integration.
In preparation for this discussion we consider in
this section, two principles that ensure the compati-
bility of certain types of deductive systems. It is an
interesting fact that the formal logical aspects of
these compatibility conditions can be recognized
within a model of transparent simplicity. The same
formal conditions can be given different concrete
interpretations and used to handle most intricate
situations.
The model in question is the practical (physical)
geometry of a spherical surface, in other words
geodesy. The physicist-geometer can avail himself
of two abstract geometrical systems, to wit spherical,
and plane geometry. From the point of view of the
abstract mathematician the two systems are different
and a discourse has to be completed in one or the
9 D. Hilbert, Die Grundlagen der Geometrie (B. G. Teubner,
Liepzig, Germany, 1956), 8th revised edition. English transla-
tion of the first edition (The Open Court Publishing Company,
LaSalle, Illinois, 1899, reprinted 1950).
10 Consistency is used here in the relative sense. The new
geometries can be mapped into Euclidian geometry. Any in-
consistency in the former would imply an inconsistency in the
latter.
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other system. The consistent use of the two systems
for the description of the real, physical sphere de-
pends on a number of circumstances.
In the first place, we establish a hierarchy between
the two systems: We stipulate that in case of conflict
spherical geometry should have priority. We express
this by saying that spherical geometry is the dominant
system, and plane geometry is called either derivative,
subordinate, or degenerate.
We shall refer to the relation of these systems as
supplementary relation, or briefly, supplementarity.
The second point is a clarification of what con-
stitutes a "conflict" between the systems. In the
mathematical sense a conflict always exists; however,
in physical geometry we dismiss it as empirically
irrelevant if it falls below the finite accuracy of the
measurements which the theory is supposed to
describe. The accuracy of measurement cannot be
improved over the diffuseness set by thermal noise.
Somewhat more generally, we proceed to formu-
late a principle to which the rules of coordination
have to conform. Experiment provides us with the
values of continuous variables within a certain ac-
curacy. However, the analysis of mathematical
physics would be extremely cumbersome and lose
much of its precision if the finite width of continuous
parameters corresponding to empirical quantities
were to be observed at every step. In actual practice,
the segments of finite widths are sharpened into
definite points of the continuum for the purposes
of the analysis. However, the results obtained have
no physical meaning unless they are sufficiently in-
sensitive to the actual unsharpness of the continuous
parameters."
Mathematical solutions satisfying this requirement
will be called regular. Solutions that change their
essential features when the fictitious sharpening is
given up will be referred to as singular. They are
devoid of physical meaning except as possible step-
ping stones to more realistic results. The requirement
that mathematical solutions be regular in order to
have a physical meaning will prove to be of great
importance and deserves to be called a principle, the
principle of regularity.
The second point concerns the question of scale.
Spherical geometry is characterized by an absolute
unit of length R, the radius of the sphere. If R -- oo,
the sphere degenerates into the plane, the dominant
11 See R. Courant and D. Hilbert, Methoden der Mathe-
matischen Physik II (Verlag Julius Springer, Berlin, 1937).
p. 176. Leon Brillouin, Science and Information Theory (Aca-
demic Press Inc., New York, 1962), 2nd ed. Chapter 21.
into the supplementary system. Let the linear dimen-
sion of a geometrical figure be a, then the parameter
a/R appropriately expresses the deviation of spheri-
cal from plane geometry. It becomes meaningful to
say that for small values of the parameter (aiR - E
<< 1, where e is the unsharpness of the parameter
because of the inaccuracy of the measurement or
because of noise) the subordinate system is asymp-
totically valid. Otherwise we have to fall back on the
dominant system.
It is interesting to note that within plane geometry
there is no absolute unit and it is meaningless to
speak about small or large figures. All theorems are
invariant under a transformation consisting of a
change of the unit of length. We say also that plane
geometry is scale invariant, or, it contains the theo-
rem of similarity.' 2
The transition from the subordinate to the domi-
nant system marks the breakdown of scale invariance.
At the same time, however, the dominant system
is characterized by an invariance of a novel type.
In spherical geometry we have invariance of curva-
ture. The more subtle invariances of the dominant
systems of physics will be considered in Sees. III and
IV.
In the course of historical evolution the dominant
system has to be established by generalizing the
subordinate system that reached what we shall call
a marginal breakdown. In general, this is a task of
great difficulty. While the converse procedure of
arriving through a limiting process from the domi-
nant to the subordinate system is a great deal more
straightforward, even this transition is not without
pitfalls.
Just as the sphere does not contain the infinite
plane, so spherical geometry does not contain plane
geometry. While the limiting process R -x c trans-
forms every theorem of spherical geometry into one
of plane geometry, the converse is not true. Thus the
important laws of similarity of triangles and other
figures have no counterpart in spherical geometry.
The possibility of deriving such theorems is a new
discovery, possible only in plane geometry. We shall
see that the situation is quite similar for other pairs
of dominant-supplementary theories.
We shall say that the inconsistency between the
subordinate and the dominant system is under con-
trol, or that the inconsistency is controlled, if the
range of validity of the subordinate system is known,
and within these limits the compatibility with the
dominant system is ensured.
12 E. P. Wigner, Proc. Am. Phil. Soc. 93, 521 (1949).
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III. LOGICAL INTEGRATION
Table I contains a simplified, symbolic representa-
tion of the integrated structure of systems that re-
sults from the application of the principles discussed
in the last two sections. Although this structure,
briefly, the block diagram, is still incomplete and
tentative, it is adequate to provide the point of
departure for our discussion. We have to remember
that our method is set up to eliminate the shortcom-
ings of the initially posited structure rather than to
perpetuate them.
The block diagram can be discussed in different
degrees of detail. On the most superficial level the
theories associated with the various "blocks" are
interpreted along traditional lines as suggested by
their designation listed in Fig. 1. It will be recognized
that the theories connected by arrows are indeed in a
supplementary relation with each other, and the
limiting processes leading to the derivative systems
-COMPATIBILITY - - - CONTROLLED INCONSISTENCY, -
SUPPLEMENTARY RELATION-?-- INCOMPLETELY UNDERSTOOD
RELATION
FIG. 1. Block diagram representing tentative structure
of physics. Explanation of symbols designating deductive
systems:
CMP Classical mechanics of particles,
CMP (u) Classical mechanics of particles (microscopic in-
terpretation of particles),
PhCM Phenomenological classical mechanics,
CG Classical gravitational theory,
CED Classical electrodynamics,
RM Relativistic mechanics,
RG Relativistic gravitational theory,
TD Thermodynamics,
MTE Macroscopic thermodynamics of equilibrium,
STE Statistical thermodynamics of equilibrium,
MTD Macroscopic thermodynamics,
STD Statistical thermodynamics,
QM Quantum mechanics,
QS Quasistatic quantum mechanics,
QD Quantum dynamics,
are formally associated with the vanishing of the
absolute constants indicated in the diagram.
Maybe, the most significant aspect of the block
diagram is that it exhibits CMP as derivative to
several systems and dominant to none. This is in
complete contrast with the logical structure hypothe-
sized in classical physics in which CMP should have
been dominant to all the other deductive systems of
physics. We shall use the discussion of the block
diagram to sketch some of the refocusing that is
made necessary by the changed role of mechanics.
In the current section we shall deal primarily with
the relations involving CM, CED, and RM. These
relations are fairly well understood and our brief
discussion serves mainly to clarify our terminology,
in handling this situation; moreover it provides the
prototype for the discussion of the more problematic,
relation among CMP, STE, and QM in Sec. IV.
If the discussion of the block diagram is to go be-
yond the broadly qualitative state, the theories have
to be represented as deductive systems. This form of
organization is not current in physics at the present
time, and the traditional axiomatizations that are
available, say for thermodynamics, do not satisfy the
requirements of the present program.
Attempts to remedy this situation by up-to-date
axiomatization bring to focus another complication.
Most of the basic theories of Table I are too ramified
and diverse to be compressed within the limitations
of a rigorously built deductive system. However,
these difficulties can be overcome by using a multi-
plicity of deductive systems, even within one basic
theory. The establishment of this more intricate
logical structure is in each case a major enterprise.
In Sec. IV we summarize the specific problems that
were encountered in MTE and STE.
In this section we first consider the case of CED,
which is much simpler because the elaboration in-
volves no departure from traditional lines of thought.
A satisfactory axiomatization could be centered
around Maxwell's equations, or an appropriate
variational principle. The properties of material media
are to be accounted for only phenomenologically; a
microscopic description is outside the scope of CED.
If we let the light velocity c -* o, CED reduces
to electrostatics (ES) which can be considered as a
derivative system of the dominant CED. Even main-
taining c finite, we obtain a series of theories classified
in terms of X/a and co, where X and w are the wave-
length and frequency of the electromagnetic disturb-
ance, and a is a length specifying the size of the
apparatus.
Additional possibilities arise if polarization and
coherence properties are taken into account. How-
ever, we do not enter into these details at this point,
and confine ourselves to the specification of a simple
structure in Fig. 2.
It is apparent even without a detailed study that
these theories are in supplementary relation to each
other and CED is dominant to all. Thus the intrinsic
logical structure of CED is somewhat of the type
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represented in Fig. 1 for physics as a whole, with the
exception that the latter is not (yet?) derived from a
single dominant system.
The block diagram of Fig. 1 represents, in a way,
a structure of low "logical resolution," which, if the
CED
ES MS GO
w Xk/a
ECT QUASISTATIONARY CURRENTS, CIRCUIT THEORY FINITE >>I
MS STATIONARY CURRENTS, MAGNETOSTATICS O O
WO WAVE OPTICS FINITE I
GO GEOMETRICAL OPTICS a O
ES ELECTROSTATICS C =O 0 co
FIG. 2. Structure of classical electrodynamics.
need arises, may be supplemented by a "logical fine
structure."
Although the intrinsic logical structure of CED
would deserve a detailed study, this is not important
for the purposes of the present paper.
A characteristic feature of the block diagram is the
occurrence of a "triangle" formed by three deductive
systems, the relations of which are represented in one
of two alternative forms:
(a) (b)
FIG. 3. Typical in-
tersystem configura-
tions for the resolution
of inconsistencies.
In either case, the base of the triangle is formed by
two systems that are mutually inconsistent with each
other. This incompatibility is resolved by a third
system which is either dominant to both of the
original systems, or dominant to one and consistent
with the other.
It is interesting to look at this logical constellation
from the point of view of historical evolution. It is a
historical fact that the incompatible systems are the
first ones to appear on the scene. Their incompati-
bility, represented in the diagram by a broken line,
constitutes a "line of stress," which is resolved by the
discovery of the dominant system. The inconsistency
is thus brought under control in the sense explained
at the end of Sec. II. For the sake of concreteness,
we single out the systems CM, CED, and RM for a
more detailed discussion. These systems are related
to each other according to the pattern of Fig. 3(a).
The fact that RM and CM are in a dominant-
supplementary relation to each other is obvious.
There is, in fact, a close mathematical analogy be-
tween the relativistic and Newtonian kinematics on
the one hand, and spherical and plane geometry (see
Sec. II) on the other. The absolute constant is the
velocity of light c, the dominant invariance principle
is relativistic invariance. The scale invariance of the
supplementary system CM manifests itself, e.g., in
the linear law of the vector addition of velocities.
On the other hand, RM is consistent with CED
rather than dominant to it, since the velocity of light
c maintains its finite value. The limiting process
c - o leads to electrostatics, a highly degenerate
part of CED.
The touchstone for the mutual consistency of CM
and CED is the solution of two basic problems. The
first is the fast motion of charged particles in the
electromagnetic field. The second is the effect of the
motion of the frame of reference of the observer on
electromagnetic phenomens, including optics.
Historically, the study of both problems contrib-
uted essentially to the discovery of RM. In particu-
lar, Lorentz developed the theory of the electron in
the electromagnetic field. However, this line of
thought was complicated by uncertainties pertaining
to the structure of the electron.
Einstein's great discovery was that the second of
the aforementioned problems can be solved in
phenomenological terms without involving assump-
tions concerning the structure of matter. The incon-
sistency of CM and CED was brought under control,
in the sense explained in Sec. II, by giving up the
space-time structure of CM in favor of that implicit
in CED. Thus the intersystem relation between CM
and CED was inverted and it was the latter that as-
sumed the dominant role. More precisely, CED could
be supplemented consistently by a mechanics (RM)
that is dominant to CM. The expectation that all of
physics, and in particular CED, is reducible to CM,
was therewith disproved.
The establishment of RM led also to a consistent
solution of Lorentz's problem of the motion of
charged particles. However, it is not easy to delimit
the phenomena in such a way as to stay clear of
quantum effects and the subtler aspects of the con-
sistency of the RM of the electron are still under
discussion.13
The restructuring of physics connected with the
recognition that the concepts of CMP do not have
the expected fundamental character is a complex
13 F. Rohrlich, Ann. Phys. (N. Y.) 13, 93 (1961).
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enterprise. For the purposes of discussion, it is con-
venient to divide the problem into three main
divisions:
(i) Kinematics, or space-time structure,
(ii) Dynamics, the concept of force,
(iii) The structural properties of matter.
The abovementioned analysis leading to RM corre-
sponds to item (i) of this classification.' 4
The Newtonian concept of force as an universal
idea suffered its first setback as the action at a
distance of electrostatics and magnetostatics was
replaced by the Faraday-Maxwell field. This process
can be considered as the resolution of the incon-
sistency of the partial theories of electricity and
magnetism by the dominant CED.
This process was continued as the Newtonian
theory of gravitation CG was replaced by the relati-
vistic theory. We note that this replacement was
necessary, since the inconsistency of CG and RM had
to be resolved by the dominant RG.
In contrast, the present analysis does not require
the development of a unified field theory in which
RG and CED are consolidated into a single system.
In the first place, there is no manifest inconsistency
to be resolved in this case. And second, a unified
theory of interactions cannot fail to consider chemical
effects, which in turn are intimately connected with
the structural problems of matter." The discussion
of these is our next objective.
Up to this point our analysis is not in disagreement
with commonly held view. We conclude this section
with an item that may be considered controversial.
It was emphasized above that Einstein's analysis
leading to RM is phenomenological. However, the
analysis has one aspect, the well-known inference
about the nonexistence of the ether, which transcends
this limitation. While it is correct to say that there
is no place for the ether in RM and CED, this con-
cept has other implications which require further
study from the point of view of our present knowl-
edge.
The rejection of the ether concept is based on the
fact that the assumption of a local flow velocity is
inconsistent with RM, inasmuch as it would allow us
14 This statement is slightly oversimplified. The E = mc2 re-
lation involves in a broad sense the concept of matter.
15 Chemical interactions occur on the molecular, atomic,
nuclear, and elementary particle levels. We claim that these
varied effects have some common features to justify the use
of a generic terminology. We shall attempt to support this
point of view in the next section. This point of view is by no
means generally accepted. Molecular chemical forces are usu-
ally considered as mere instances of electromagnetic interac-
tion. The point that we emphasize, however, is that these
interactions assume quite novel features if injected into the
quantum-mechanical theory of the structure of matter.
to assign velocities that moving bodies have with
respect to an ether, stationary or otherwise. This, in
turn, is contradicted by experiment.
It was pointed out by Dirac 6 that, though this
inference seemed cogent in 1905, it is no longer con-
vincing at present. The point is that within the classi-
cal theory a fluid is necessarily endowed with a local
flow velocity, but this is not the case in QM. Thus
an electron in an atomic s state does not possess a
well-defined velocity.
It is instructive to discuss this matter in a more
general context, since it lends itself to the illustration
of our method of clarifying the meaning of primitive
concepts. The problem of the "existence of the ether"
is to be considered as a counterpart to the problem of
the "existence of the atom." Texts of modern physics
invariably argue that the answer to the first is in the
negative, to the second, in the affirmative.
There is indeed convincing experimental evidence
for the granular structure of matter. However, this
is only a qualitative statement that is to be supple-
mented by the establishment of the laws governing
the behavior of these "granules." Those denying the
existence of atoms were right in the sense that the
assumption of c-atoms obeying CMP are inconsistent
with the facts of chemistry. 7 This statement is
compatible with the existence of q-atoms obeying
QM.18
The situation is similar with the ether. In an
intuitive sense the ether was called upon to fill many
roles. We may classify these along the threefold
division invoked above in connection with the prob-
lems of mechanics:
(i) In kinematics the ether meant the existence of
an absolute frame of reference. In view of RM the
existence of such an ether is to be ruled out.
(ii) In dynamics, the most conspicuous role as-
signed to the ether was that of being the carrier of
electromagnetic effects. Einstein pointed out that
this notion is superfluous, although later, he came out
in favor of the ether in connection with RG. We refer
to the discussion of this point in a recent paper by
Holton,l' and in particular to the references given
in his footnote 24.
(iii) The role of ether in the structural properties
of matter is the most neglected aspect of this con-
16 p. A. M. Dirac, Nature 168, 906 (1951).
17 E. Mach, Prinzipien der Wdrmelehre (Johann Ambrosius
Barth, Leipzig, Germany, 1896), pp. 354-364.
18 In the next section we shall subdivide QM into QS and
QD, and accordingly we shall have to distinguish qs particles
and qd particles.
19 G. Holton, Am. J. Phys. 28, 627 (1960).
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cept, and the one that is of the greatest interest in the
present context.
The point to be realized is that the problem of
structure has two aspects: (i) Starting from ele-
mentary particles we may build up complex struc-
tures and in particular the pseudo-continuum of
macroscopic bodies. (ii) The elementary particles in
their turn may be built up as the excitons of a hypo-
thetical continuum, the ether.
The attempt of accounting for atoms as vortex
rings is a theory of this sort. The failure of this theory
is inconclusive, since it is based on the classical c
ether. It is an open question whether an ether con-
cept could be defined within QD to describe the
creation and destruction of elementary particles. To
dismiss the possibility of a qd ether because of the
inadequacy of the c ether would be as unwarranted
as to declare ultimate q particles nonexistent because
of the nonexistence of ultimate c particles.
IV. MECHANICS, THERMODYNAMICS, AND
QUANTUM MECHANICS
A. Introduction
We now turn to the central theme of our discussion
and consider the problems related to structure. The
empirical discipline dealing with the structural forms
of matter and their transformations is chemistry.2 0
Thermodynamics, in the broadest sense of the word,
is a conceptualization of this discipline in much the
same way as classical mechanics is the conceptualiza-
tion of astronomy.
Of course, the space-time detail provided by the
description of structure in classical thermodynamics
is severely limited. We claim that there are two com-
plementary methods for overcoming this limitation.
The first is the traditional method of mechanical
models, the second proceeds by the gradual deepen-
ing and extension of the thermodynamic conceptual
framework.
Our main purpose is to sketch the second method
(Secs. IV.C and IV.D), but for contrast it is impor-
tant to sum up the essence of the first (Sec. IV.B).
We denote the microscopic interpretation of classi-
cal point mechanics by CMP(tu), a symbol explained
more precisely in Sec. IV.B. In this theory, matter is
assumed to consist of invariant point particles that
trace precisely defined trajectories. Hence the space-
time detail built into the theory is the highest con-
ceivable. This amount of detail is not only unneces-
20 We shall make a few remarks about biological problems
in Sec. IV.E.
sary, but it leads to implications that are contrary
to experiment.
The present conceptual discussions of quantum
mechanics are still decisively influenced by the acci-
dents of its origin. Since the space-time detail is
overstated in CMP(M), quantum mechanics appears
as a theory that imposes limitations on the possibili-
ties of measurement.
We claim that the alternative approach that ar-
rives at quantum mechanics by an increase of the
space-time detail of thermodynamics conveys a more
germane conception of the meaning of quantum
theory as an enrichment and sharpening of common
experience."
Of course, even in order to consider this alternative
approach we have to revise some of the generally
accepted ideas concerning the nature of thermody-
namics. We start with the noncontroversial state-
ment that thermodynamics is the theory that is
always in close contact with measurement. During
the last century atomic phenomena were beyond the
reach of the available experimental techniques, and
hence it was concluded that thermodynamics should
not involve any reference to microscopic entities.
This attitude was correct under the existing condi-
tions; however, the notion that thermodynamics is
inherently macroscopic is an unwarranted generaliza-
tion.
If thermodynamics is indeed a theory of measure-
ment, it has, at present, to be substantially general-
ized in order to match the advances of experimenta-
tion into the microscopic domain.
This means that we have to give up the idea that
thermodynamics is merely the mechanics of systems
of very many degrees of freedom, and we have to
identify the more genuinely distinctive features of the
two disciplines. This we can achieve by the technique
of logical differentiation, as applied particularly to
thermodynamics.
As a first step in this direction, we have to recog-
nize that the classical theory of equilibrium is a blend
of two essentially different logical structures: We
shall distinguish the theory of Clausius and Kelvin,
on the one hand, from that of Gibbs, on the other.
In the first of these theories the thermodynamic
system is considered as a "black box" and all relevant
information is derived from the amount of energy
absorbed or provided by idealized auxiliary devices,
such as heat and work reservoirs, coupled to the
21 Whether or not this alternative approach would have been
historically possible is irrelevant for the present discussion. We
structure the transition from thermodynamics to quantum
mechanics by exploiting all of the advantages of hindsight.
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system. The main achievement of this theory is the
establishment of the concepts of internal energy and
entropy from observable mechanical quantities.
This is the situation that serves as the point of
departure for the Gibbs theory. Attention is now
turned toward the system; the concepts of internal
energy and entropy are taken for granted and are
used to provide a more detailed description of the
system in equilibrium, which includes its chemical
and phase structure.
The logical mathematical structure of the Clausius-
Kelvin theory was clarified in the axiomatic investi-
gation of Carathodory.2 2 We shall speak of the
Clausius-Kelvin-Carath6odory theory, briefly CKC.
Elsewhere 2 we have developed the axiomatics of
the macroscopic thermodynamics of equilibrium,
briefly MTE, that bears a somewhat similar relation
to the Gibbs theory.2 3 In that paper, the main
emphasis was on the theory of phase equilibrium in
which MTE represented improvements over the
classical theory. In the present context these im-
provements appear only as incidental benefits of the
improved logical structure. The main point is that
basically the same experimental material and very
nearly the same formalism are accounted for in a
different conceptual language that is in some respects
richer than either CKC or CMP(,u). Whereas MTE
cannot be reduced to CMP(Mu), it is, logically speak-
ing, an "open system" that readily admits a con-
sistent deepening and expansion in the statistical and
quantum-mechanical direction and leads to the domi-
nant systems STE and QS.
In statistical mechanics it is often assumed that
the main aspects of the program of reducing thermo-
dynamics to mechanics are unchanged as classical
mechanics is replaced by quantum mechanics. This
is, of course, a possible way of structuring the situa-
tion. We shall attempt to show, however, that an
alternative approach is more illuminating.
In the first place, the conceptual basis of CMP(,4)
is very simple, and the mechanistic reduction of
MTE would require the elimination of much of its
conceptual subtlety. In contrast, the transition from
MTE to STE and QS involves an increase in con-
ceptual wealth and sophistication. 2 4
In Sec. IV.B we shall discuss the so-called funda-
mental problems of the mechanistic system. Our
22 C. Carath6odory, Math. Ann. 67, 355 (1909).
23 J. W. Gibbs, Collected Works (Yale University Press, New
Haven, Connecticut, 1948), Vol. I.
24 This state of affairs would seem to violate the traditional
requirements of conceptual simplicity and economy. However,
these requirements can easily be carried ad absurdum, if taken
in an absolute sense rather than judged relatively to achieve-
ment.
main thesis is that, in general, these problems are
fundamental only in the context of CMP(M). More-
over, we warn against the all too common tendency
of identifying the mechanistic scheme with that of
common experience.
Sections IV.C and IV.D deal with the conceptual
structure of thermodynamics and quantum me-,
chanics. The two sections differ inasmuch as Sec.
IV.C is devoted to quasi-static problems, whereas
the role of time is more explicit in Sec. IV.D.25 The
time-dependent problems are still incompletely un-
derstood and will be discussed here only in a heuristic
vein.
The forthcoming discussion is only a program in
which innumerable details have to be filled in. The
present paper is confined to such arguments that
arise from the conceptual reinterpretations of the
existing formalism. However, the increased intuitive
insight gained in this process is suggestive of new
developments within the formalism itself. The process
of logical integration leading to QD is clearly un-
finished.
B. Classical Mechanics
According to arguments advanced in the general
part of this paper, the term "mechanics" has a
definite meaning only as the designation of a deduc-
tive system, or as a collection of deductive systems
that arise as a result of logical differentiation.
The available axiomatizations of mechanics do not
satisfy our requirements, since they have not been
devised to differentiate between various disciplines
that all go by the designation "mechanics," even
though not all of them are consistent with each other.
The following sketchy discussion provides only the
raw material for a future axiomatics, but its precision
is sufficient for the present exploratory study.
The starting point of our discussion is the analyti-
cal dynamics of mass points in the Hamiltonian, or
some equivalent form to which alone we accord the
status of a fundamental deductive system included
in the block diagram (Fig. 1). We shall refer to this
part of mechanics as the classical mechanics of parti-
cles, briefly CMP. This theory deals with isolated
systems of invariant structureless particles that can-
not be created or annihilated. These particles differ
from geometrical points only in that they have
masses and act as force centers. The kinematics of the
25 We use the term "quasistatic" in the sense that we con-
sider primarily states of equilibrium and transitions between
them. This meaning is different from that of the "quasistatic
path" of CKC. We shall refer to the quasistatic and dynamic
theories as QS and QD, respectively. Also, we use QM in a
generic sense for quantum mechanics.
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system is based on Newtonian space-time structure
and obeys Galilean relativity. An instantaneous state
is described as a point in phase space; a mechanical
process is a trajectory in this space. The dynamics is
specified in terms of the Hamiltonian, a function of
the instantaneous phase-space coordinates of the
-particles; the forces are conservative, of the "action
at a distance" type.
The concept of mass points is an idealization, but
there are two kinds of rules of correspondence for
connecting the theory with observation.
In the macroscopic interpretation the mass points
arise through concentrating the masses of well-
separated objects in their center of mass. CMP pro-
vides, then, the translational motion, while the in-
trinsic properties of the objects are either considered
irrelevant, or are referred to other theories, such as
chemistry and generalized thermodynamics.
In an essentially different microscopic interpreta-
tion, the formalism of CMP is combined with a
rudimentary atomic theory. Using the terminology
of Sec. III, we assume that matter consists of c
particles. We shall refer to the theory that has the
formalism of CMP, but in which the point masses are
interpreted in this microscopic fashion as CMP(u),
and the symbol CMP will be used to designate the
macroscopic interpretation only.
The reason that CMP is accorded a fundamental
status is due to the validity of a series of important
general theorems.
Using a plausible terminology, we say that the
conceptual input of the theory is a set of invariant
mass points with their instantaneous state in r space,
while the output consists of additional invariants, the
integrals of motion, and the principle of mechanical
determinism provided explicitly as the r trajectory.
Among these theorems, the principle of mechanical
determinism deserves special attention because its
basic feature has been applied far beyond the scope
of classical mechanics. A formulation that gives
justice to this wider range of application states in
essence that causal chains are conditioned by the
exhaustive specification of the initial states of the
systems involved. 26 In the cases of CMP and CMP(A)
the specification extends to the phase-space coordi-
nates of all point masses of an entire isolated system.
If, as usual, the system is coupled to its environment,
then the initial state of the environment has to be
26 We are using the terms "causality" and "determinism" as
synonyms. Such usage is encouraged by the fact that CMP
has only a single mechanism for the precise interpretation of
both concepts. In reality, the terms in question suggest dif-
ferent meanings, and indeed we shall provide distinct interpre-
tations for them in the thermodynamic theory.
also completely specified; in practice this is an
impossible task. Therefore, in the strict sense,
mechanical determinism is empirically meaningful
only for systems that are effectively decoupled from
their environment. Evidently the case of planetary
systems plays a uniquely favorable role in this re-
spect.
The wealth of general theorems of CMP is in
curious contrast with the scarcity of soluble special
problems. In fact, the case of two mass points inter-
acting with central forces is the only rigorously
soluble problem in the theory.
It is of obvious interest to extend the range of
CMP by making it more flexible in handling concrete
problems. Apart from such important technical
devices as perturbation theory, this extension can be
achieved very effectively by joining to the basis of
CMP additional assumptions that are of a more or
less phenomenological nature. We shall refer collec-
tively to a number of deductive systems that are
obtained by joining one or more of the following
assumptions to the basis of CMP as phenomenologi-
cal classical mechanics (PhCM):
(i) Potential energies specified phenomenologi-
cally rather than in terms of particle coordinates,
(ii) Continuous distribution of matter resulting
in the mechanics of rigid bodies, fluids, and elastic
media,
(iii) Dissipative forces,
(iv) Statistical assumptions,
(v) Assumptions of nonholonomic and rheonomic
constraints.
While PhCM is of very great practical importance,
this extension of the scope of the theory invalidates
the general theorems of CMP. In fact, dissipative
forces invalidate the constancy of the integrals of
motion; and the manipulation of constraints substi-
tutes one phase space for another, while a mechanical
process is a trajectory in a fixed phase space.
The statistical assumptions that could conceivably
be used in connection with CMP are of two sorts.
First, one might consider an ensemble of identical
systems with a probability distribution function of
their representative points in r phase space at a
given instant. The statistical assumptions of the
second kind (stochastic assumptions) involve proba-
bilities at a time t conditioned by the known states
of the systems at an earlier time to (transition proba-
bilities). Although CMP is entirely neutral with re-
spect to the distribution of initial states and any
assumption of this sort can be consistently joined to
it, stochastic assumptions are inconsistent with
mechanical determinism.
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The feasibility of the classical reduction program
hinges on the solution of a number of problems that
are considered to be fundamental relative to the
mechanistic program. The most important of these
are: (a) stability; (b) hydrodynamics, including dis-
sipative and stochastic effects; and (c) manipulation
of constraints. These are, of course, closely connected
with the assumptions of PhCM listed above.
The problem of stability was a stumbling block for
the theory. Postulating appropriate phenomenologi-
cal forces did yield stability for a limited number of
structures without ever explaining a fraction of the
facts of chemistry. After the discovery of the role of
Coulomb forces among particles, even this limited
result was found to be precluded by Earnshaw's
theorem.27
The most successful contributions to the reduction
program fall into class (b). The rigorous approach to
these problems is based on the qualitative observa-
tion that systems of many degrees of freedom starting
from an arbitrary initial state and evolving in a
deterministic fashion seem to exhibit a randomiza-
tion, as far as a macroscopic observer can ascertain.
This randomization is only an appearance and the
latent memory of the initial state manifests itself in
the Poincar6 cycles.
Although it is plausible that conservative systems
do often behave in such a fashion, it is very difficult
to state these ideas in quantitative terms. Moreover,
the methods necessarily ignore the principle of regu-
larity, and therefore often have an unrealistic charac-
ter. In view of these difficulties, it became customary
to develop theories of dissipation by adding stochastic
assumptions to the theory. This procedure can be
pragmatically justified by reference to the fact that
real systems are always subject to random perturba-
tions. Instead of reducing randomness and dissipation
to dynamics, one studies the interplay of randomness
and dynamics. Many of the existing theories that
make use of randomness assumptions can be inte-
grated into STD, although they do not contribute
to the classical reduction problem.
We turn finally to the problem of constraints. At
first sight this problem does not seem to arise in
CMP(u), since walls, other constraints, and the
experimenter himself consists of atoms, and all could
be included in the system and described in a super
phase space. Hence the reducibility to mechanics can
be upheld, but only at the price of giving up the
separation of the object of experimentation from the
experimenting subject.
7 W. T. Scott, Ann. J. Phys. 27, 418 (1959).
At this point we are reminded of the fact that
CMP is the conceptualization of astronomy, an
observational science.
We shall avoid all these paradoxes in thermody-
namics and quantum mechanics which can be con-
sidered as conceptualizations of chemistry, an experi-
mental discipline.
C. From Thermodynamics to Quantum
Mechanics. Quasistatics
We shall develop the conceptual structure of a
generalized thermodynamics that extends in succes-
sive approximations from a purely macroscopic
theory (MTE) through statistics (STE) to quantum
mechanics (QS). MTE and STE have been treated
in more detail elsewhere.2 At all three stages we
confine ourselves to describing states of equilibrium,
although we do allow for transitions among these
states without describing them in detail. We shall
refer to theories of this type as quasi-statics.
Equilibrium is a primitive concept analytically de-
fined in terms of a deductive system, and thus will
be redefined for each of the theories considered.
As we have mentioned in Sec. IV.A the conceptual
structure of MTE is in practically every respect
complementary to CMP(,u).
Instead of building up systems out of mass points,
in MTE one builds them out of "cells" that cover a
certain region in space. We refer to the cells as simple
systems, or subsystems, and to a collection of cells as
a composite system.
The independent variables of the theory are addi-
tive conserved quantities, briefly, additive invariants
X1, X2 ,.-..28 Composite systems are specified by
sets of Xla(i = 1, 2,. · .a = 1, 2,- .· ), where the sub-
script i designates the types of variables, and the
superscript a refers to the subsystems of the com-
posite system.
Explicitly, the Xi are the volume V, the internal
energy U, and the mole numbers of the independent
chemical components N1 , N2, .. In spite of a super-
ficial similarity, energy and mole numbers play a
role in MTE that is very different from that in
CMP(u). In mechanics energy is not additive, and
it is only the nonadditive contribution, the interac-
tion potential that leads to the coupling of different
systems. We shall see that in MTE the most charac-
teristic coupling comes about through the exchange
28 The number of the invariants Xi is significant; it involves
the concept of thermodynamic degrees of freedom and leads
to the phase rules. 2 We ignore these matters here for the sake
of brevity.
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of energy and of other additive invariants.2 9
The mole numbers Ni have an essentially different
meaning in MTE and in CMP(M,). The most signifi-
cant aspect of this difference is not in the shift from
moles to molecules, since this is a simple scaling by
Avogadro's number. In a context that does not in-
-volve numerical calculation, the same notation can
be used interchangeably in both senses without risk
of confusion. The important point is rather that the
numbers of molecules of CMP(p) are absolute in-
variants, the molecules themselves cannot be created
or annihilated. In contrast, MTE deals with mole-
cules that are subject to chemical change. Hence,
the numbers of the molecules of chemical species, or
briefly species, are in general not invariants.
The situation is different with the numbers specify-
ing the amounts of the independent chemical com-
ponents, or briefly components. These are constructed
to be the invariants of the relevant chemical reactions
and thus they qualify as the additive invariants of
MTE.
Needless to say, "molecule" stands here for any
kind of discrete lump of matter that has a definite
identity and is subject to transformation into other
"molecules." In addition to conventional molecules
we have atoms, ions, radicals, nuclei, and elementary
particles.
An important implication of the foregoing discus-
sion is that the numbers Ni are, in general, only
relative invariants and the entire formalism of MTE
is only relative to the set of chemical reactions that
have been used to define the independent com-
ponents. The formalism is to be adjusted to any
change brought about in the set of reactions.3 0
We turn now to the discussion of processes. In
CMP(u) all processes are alike, inasmuch as all of
them are r trajectories. In MTE we have processes
of different types and this variety is further increased
in the deeper, dominant theories to be considered
later.
An important type of process is the transfer of a
29 A second type of coupling is conveyed by surface forces
such as elastic and Maxwell stresses. All apparent action-at-a-
distance forces should be put in this form. Thus, surface forces
described by scalar pressure integrate easily into the formal-
ism, and the displacement of a boundary between two systems
can be considered as an exchange of volume. For stress tensors
shape effects involving distant parts of the composite system
may come into play which complicates matters considerably.
We exclude these situations in the present discussion in which
we aim only at the clarification of the most characteristic
features of MTE.
30 While there is no way of selecting absolute invariant
species or components in molecular and nuclear chemistry,
such absolute invariants are likely to govern the transforma-
tion of elementary particles.
quantity X from the subsystem a to b during an
arbitrary, fixed time interval.
The transfer quantity corresponding to the energy,
with all of the other X's fixed, is called heat.
Walls are the boundaries separating two systems
which completely prevent the passage of one or more
additive invariants, say Xx, regardless of the nature
of any system that may be adjacent, but permit free
passage to all others, say Xk. The wall is restrictive
of the Xx and nonrestrictive of the Xk. Walls are said
to exert passive forces on the distribution of the
additive invariants. The restrictions on a system
imposed by its walls are referred to as constraints.
It is most natural to think of a wall as a physical
system with definite conductivity properties with
respect to energy and matter (diffusion). Such sys-
tems are idealized as walls in MTE if their conduc-
tivities can be approximated as zero or infinite with
respect to the time scale of the experiments con-
sidered. Alternatively, however, a wall may also be
a mathematical surface. Thus a closed mathematical
surface is restrictive of volume and allows us to
define an open thermodynamic system that ex-
changes energy and mass with its surroundings. An
important type of "wall" is provided by phase
boundaries.2
Finally, the concept of thermodynamic process is
easily extended to chemical reactions. In this case
the molecular potential barriers stabilizing chemical
species play the role of walls. As a last resort, all walls
(except of course mathematical surfaces) depend on
molecular potential barriers that may, or may not,
be macroscopically organized.
We call thermodynamic operations any imposition
or relaxation of a constraint through the uniting or
subdividing of systems, or the altering of the type of
any of its walls. In the presence of the existing con-
straints some of the variables XIx are constant. We
call these fixed variables. Those that are not entirely
determined by the constraints are the free variables
Xk. As a rule, we shall use Greek and Roman sub-
scripts to denote fixed and free variables, respec-
tively. The various admissible values of the free
variables are called virtual states. The processes lead-
ing from one virtual state to another are virtual
processes.
The distinction of thermodynamic operations and
processes is a characteristic feature of the present
approach. The admission of thermodynamic opera-
tions into the framework of the theory allows one to
account for experimental procedures that have no
place within CMP(,u) because they correspond to
transitions from one r space to another. Thus
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thermodynamics allows us to formally account for
manipulation on thermodynamic systems. In par-
ticular, such manipulations may be performed on
systems in the course of a measurement.
Yet the insistence on operations as contrasted with
processes does not necessarily require the interven-
tion of an experimentalist, and does not introduce
more subjective elements into the theory than are
warranted by the nature of the situation considered.
Thus in the case of chemical reactions and phase
transitions, supplying catalysts or inhibitors that
speed up or slow down the rates of reactions is the
corresponding thermodynamic operation. In an auto-
matic chemical plant, and even more in biochemical
processes, the "operations" become effective without
the interference of an experimentalist and it may be
more adequate to speak of parametric processes
which control or govern other processes. This is quite
in line with the use of these terms in cybernetics. 3 '
According to the present approach, the relevance
of the cybernetic concepts mentioned is not confined
to applications in engineering and in biology. These
concepts play a fundamental role, even in the micro-
scopic approach to the dynamics of structure. This
conclusion is confirmed and extended in our interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics.
Another implication of the foregoing remarks is
that we can use both the mole numbers of species,
or those of components in our formalism, provided
that we remember that the former are free and the
latter are fixed variables. Of course, the distinction
between these two classes is not absolute, but is
relative to the specific conditions that govern reaction
rates.
Although thus far we have been describing the
conceptual raw material of MTE, we note that our
discussion is equally valid with respect to STE, the
statistical thermodynamics of equilibrium. However,
the two theories diverge in their formalization of
equilibrium.
We arrive at the concept of equilibrium by noting
that the foregoing considerations leave the values of
free variables undetermined. However, in isolated
composite systems there are, in addition to the
"passive forces" exerted by constraints, also "active
forces" originating in the intrinsic dynamics of the
system which bring about a quiescent equilibrium in
which the free variables take on asymptotically con-
stant values.
Although the trend toward equilibrium is the basic
experimental fact underlying thermodynamics, the
31 N. Wiener, Cybernetics (J. Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York,
1961), 2nd ed.
concept of equilibrium is nonetheless quite elusive,
since there are no purely observational means for
deciding whether an apparently quiescent system
has actually reached equilibrium or is merely stranded
in a nonequilibrium state while imperceptibly drift-
ing toward equilibrium.
In the classical approach one meets this difficulty.
by advancing comparatively weak statements. Thus,
in essence, the second law asserts the impossibility
of processes in which systems drift away from equi-
librium, but it does not claim that equilibrium is
actually reached. The difficulty with this method is,
however, that few if any significant results can be
derived from these postulates without using a num-
ber of additional assumptions concerning the proper-
ties of material systems, such as the existence of
homogeneous phases, validity of equations of state,
and the like, which implicitly assume that equilib-
brium is reached. Since these assumptions are of
limited validity, the rigor of the theory which the
painstaking establishment of the universal principles
was meant to ensure is considerably impaired.
In contrast to the classical procedure, we postulate
in MTE that systems do reach their equilibrium and
that the equilibrium values of the free variables are
picked out from the set of virtual states by an
extremum principle. The extremal function for this
principle is the entropy function; the extremum is, by
convention, a maximum.
For simple systems the entropy function is a first-
order homogeneous function of the additive in-
variants
S = S(X,,X 2 , .. ) (4.1)
and satisfies certain regularity conditions. It is con-
venient to number the variables so that X1 = U.
The entropy function of a composite system is the
sum of the entropies of its subsystems. The entropy
maximum principle is written formally as
S(Xx) = maxk{S(XklX} = S(Xk,Xx), (4.2)
where Xk and Xx symbolize all of the free and fixed
variables, respectively, and the Xk represent the
values of the Xk for which the maximum in (4.2) is
attained and which appear experimentally as the
equilibrium values of the free variables.
The entropy is a primitive concept of MTE and is
defined implicitly in terms of the maximum principle
(4.2). At the same time, the validity of this principle
is associated in the observational domain with the
establishment of equilibrium. The aforementioned
difficulties inherent in the equilibrium concept are
now solved as follows. The implications of the
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formalism of MTE are not to be taken as the pre-
diction of the actual behavior of a given system, but
rather as a statement of the normal equilibrium
behavior. The comparison of the observed behavior
of systems with the theoretical normal equilibrium
yields a set of practical criteria for deciding whether
or not equilibrium prevails.
To be sure, within MTE these criteria are, strictly
speaking, only of a necessary character. In order to
clinch the argument by establishing sufficient criteria,
we have to use the methods of STE and QMS. We
shall return to this question below.
Relation (4.1) is usually called the fundamental
equation (f.e.). It has the remarkable property of
containing all of the thermostatic information about
the system. It can be visualized as a surface in the
space of the variables S, X1, X,. · · * to which we shall
refer as the Gibbs surface in Gibbs space.
It is convenient to assume, first, that the f.e. is
given, and to return later to the combined experi-
mental-theoretical task of establishing it for concrete
systems.32 With the f.e. known, in principle, it is
possible to develop the implications of the maximum
principle (4.2). Let the entropy of a composite sys-
tem in equilibrium be Si. Consider any kind of a
thermodynamic operation in which some of the in-
ternal constraints of the system are relaxed, and thus
the manifold of virtual states is increased. With the
increase of the set of comparison states, the maximum
(4.2) either increases or remains unchanged. De-
noting the entropy in the relaxed equilibrium state
Sf, we have
(a) S > S,
or (4.3)
(b) S,= Si.
In case (a) the relaxation of constraints triggers
a process leading to a redistribution of the additive
invariants, that is, to a new equilibrium. This process
involves the increase in entropy:
DS = S- S. (4.4)
The symbol D indicates an actual change in contrast
to virtual changes denoted by A.
In case (b) the relaxation of constraints leads to
no process at all.
Simple as these statements are, they have broad
implications that enable us to assess the relation of
MTE with reality, that is, with experience under-
stood in the broad sense of the word.
The fact that case (b) does indeed occur indicates
that the value of the entropy and the entire for-
32 In order to avoid repetition, we shall consider the em-
pirical foundation only in the context of STE.
malism of MTE is insensitive to the distinction of
whether or not a certain value of a variable is held
constant by active or by passive forces. This feature
of MTE is not rigorously concordant with experi-
ence, since the active forces that bring about the
asymptotically constant values of the free variables
also produce fluctuations, while the passive forces,
or constraints, preclude fluctuations.
Remarkably enough, this limitation of validity
hardly affects the usefulness of MTE. In the first
place, fluctuations are often of negligible importance.
Even more noteworthy is the fact that the marginal
limitations of MTE are easily removed by refine-
ment rather than disruption of its foundations.
Case (a) involving an increase of entropy leads
to even more searching questions. How did the
temporal concept "increase" suddenly emerge in the
theory that does not even contain the concept of
"time"?
Formally, the entropy maximum principle (4.2)
is nothing but the well-known simple result of
the calculus of variations according to which the
maximum of a functional does not decrease as the
set of trial functions is increased. The temporal
aspect enters the picture through the interplay of
operations and processes. If the relaxation of con-
straints leads to S > S, then this operation trig-
gers a process in which the potentiality of a system
for a new equilibrium is realized. 33
The process itself has no counterpart in the for-
malism of MTE. The representation of this system
reappears in this theory only after the new equi-
librium is reached. This happens at a time that is
later than the instant when the operation was per-
formed. This is the point where the concept of
temporal ordering enters the theory.
The description will continue to be valid until
another operation triggers a new process. The repre-
sentation of the system in disconnected time inter-
vals is quite analogous to the spatial representation
in terms of disjoint cells. All this may be summed up
by saying that the system is described in a four-
dimensional piecewise continuous space-time mani-
fold. With each four-dimensional cell there is associ-
ated a point of Gibbs space, a set of numbers S,
X1, X 2,- · · specifying the equilibrium distribution of
the relevant additive invariants.3 4
33 At least this happens in what we call the normal equilib-
rium case. The alternative possibility is that the system re-
mains stranded in the initial state that is now no longer an
equilibrium, or in some intermediate frozen-in nonequilibrium
state.
34 This combination of the space-time manifold with Gibbs
space constitutes the rudimentary elements of a nonlocal field
theory.
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The simple interplay between operation and
process can be iterated to produce the description of
complex situations that will be discussed somewhat
further in Secs. IV.D and IV.E.
The above-mentioned classification of thermo-
dynamic operations into classes (a) and (b) is im-
portant enough to be designated by special terms.
We say that an operation is irreversible if it produces
an entropy increase DS = S - S;. This quantity is
called the measure of irreversibility. An operation is
reversible if it does not produce an entropy increase.
Reversible operations occur in pairs; the relaxation
and the reimposition of the same constraint that can
be repeated indefinitely without producing any
change in the system, except for the admission or
suppression of fluctuations, a distinction not regis-
tered within MTE. We note that, in contrast to the
usual procedure, we distinguish reversible and ir-
reversible operations, rather than processes. The
processes of the type considered thus far are all
irreversible.
It is natural to ask two questions at this point.
(i) How do we define irreversible thermodynamics,
or, as we prefer to call it MTD, if irreversibility
enters already so decisively in MTE? (ii) How do we
arrive at the quasistatic processes of the CKC
theory?
The answer to (i) is that the relaxation of an old
to a new equilibrium is indeed considered both by
MTE and by MTD, but the two theories differ in the
detail of the description. In particular, MTD con-
siders the relaxation time and to some extent the
intermediate nonequilibrium states.35
The answer to (ii) is obtained by means of the
following construction. A simple system can be
coupled to a sequence of auxiliary systems, so that
each operation triggers a process. A sequence of such
operations and processes is called a path that is not
uniquely specified by the initial and the final states.
In particular, by increasing the number of well-
chosen intermediate operations, the total measure
of irreversibility can be decreased below an arbitrary
threshold. In this limiting sense one can speak of
reversible paths. These reversible paths, which are
rather complex constructs in MTE, are the basic
concepts in the CKC thermodynamics.
The entropy maximum principle states in essence
that, given the nature of the systems involved in
terms of their f.e., the fixed variables determine the
equilibrium values of the free variables. Whether or
35 We note that MTD deals also with situations that do not
connect an old with a new equilibrium, such as stationary
currents and time-dependent environments.
not these equilibrium values are unique and under
what conditions is not a matter of postulation but
can be deduced from the theory. The clarification of
this issue is indeed its main achievement. It appears
that the abovementioned equilibrium values are
almost unique with some qualifications that will be
stated below. This result we have called2 the principle
of thermostatic determinism.
The entropy maximum principle is used to define·
in a well-known fashion the concepts of stable and'
metastable equilibrium. 36 The formalism, as it has
been sketched thus far, is too scanty to carry us much
further. It can be made considerably more flexible
by transforming the f.e. to other sets of independent
variables. Each of these transformations has an
intuitive interpretation and extends the scope of the
formalism to another class of experimental situations.
The first step in this transformation theory is to
solve the f.e. S = S(U, X2, X3,- ..) for the energy
(4.5)
We shall refer to the formalism based on (4.1) and
(4.5) as the entropy and energy schemes, respectively.
Formally, the transition from (4.1) and (4.5) con-
sists merely of the rotation of the Gibbs space,
thereby resulting in the interchange of the roles of
S and U as dependent and independent variables,
and the two schemes are consistent with each other.
In particular, they lead to equivalent stability
criteria.
At the same time the transition to the energy
scheme brings about a significant extension of the
types of processes that are accounted for. The
formalism is set up in terms of processes that con-
serve the independent variables summed over the
composite system. Hence, in the entropy scheme we
have energy conservation; the manipulation of the
constraints do not involve any work and irreversible
operations trigger irreversible processes. In the
energy scheme, the total entropy is conserved, and
hence operations37 are reversible, but involve work
performed on or by the environment.
We shall refer to the two kinds of processes as
entropic and energetic processes, respectively.
An important extension of the formalism of MTE
is the introduction of the intensities. These can be
36 We note that the former is still not an absolute stability in
the sense that every statement of MTE is relative to the
choice of independent components, determined in turn by the
set of relevant reactions. In principle, most if not all stable
states can become metastable if the proper catalysts are added.
37 In the energy scheme operations and processes are in-
separably tied up. We may use the terms interchangeably.
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defined in either scheme as the conjugate variables
to the Xi:
responses Xk of the system become temperature
independent and therefore are poor indicators of the
aU _ U
P = 
- = T,
aX,- as
aS as 1
dX daU T'
Pi - a
dXi '
as7ri- ax '
Here, T is the thermodynamic tempi
' other Pi are negative pressure and t.
potentials. Moreover,
i> 2.
In order to appreciate the signific~
intensive variables, it is convenient to si
cell of a composite system for detailed co
and join all the others to provide the "ei
of this system. We require also that the
of the environment be very large, in the I
compared with the system of interest. 
ment (called also a generalized reservoir)
by the set of its intensities Po, po, .
tion is quite schematic; it ignores the
structure of the environment that mt
complex. The specification is adequate, 
for deciding whether or not a system is in
when coupled to this environment. The 
this is that the intensities of the system ,
those of the environment: Pk = P.
In general, for a given set of Pk the
have a uniquely determined set of va
conjugate Xk, and vice versa. The condi
is
(P,P2, · · z· 
a(X1,X2,' .)
In the so-called regular points of (
where conditions (4.9) are satisfied the
thermostatic determinism takes on a
form: For a system in equilibrium with
R (Pk) the free variables take on a ui
values X2 and vice versa. We shall say t
Pk and Xk are matched with each other.
This mutual determination of the inv
system and the intensities of a reservoir
by experiment. Nevertheless, the limitati
by conditions (4.9) are significant. The
question vanishes at critical points and
absolute zero.
In the first case the initial intensities
quate for determining the values of the fi
(e.g., mole numbers per given volume) be
huge critical fluctuations. Near absolu
temperature.
i > 2, (4.6) Thus the singularity of the formalism of MTE at
critical points and at absolute zero has its counter-
part in the experimental situation. Consequently,
the limitation of MTE is rather different from the
breakdown of, say CMP(iu). The information pro-
erature, the vided by the theory is incomplete rather than in-
he chemical correct.correct.
It is easy to point out the oversimplification in
(4.8) MTE that is responsible for its lack of detail, and
to formulate a heuristic idea that guides us towards
ance of the the deepening of its foundations. Whereas in MTE
ngle out one the virtual states have but a formal role, in the new
)nsideration, theory they are assigned physical reality as fluctua-
ivironment" tions states. The free variables of a thermodynamic
over-all size system are considered as random variables and the
imit infinite, principle of thermostatic determinism is weakened
The environ- to the extent that instead of the values of these
is specified variables, only their probability distribution functions
This descrip- (d.f.) are assumed to be fixed in equilibrium.
detailed cell The injection of statistical ideas into the theory
ay be quite calls for an extension of the conceptual structure.
nevertheless, First, we have to consider ensembles of systems
equilibrium e (xklxx). An ensemble is defined as an unlimited set
condition for of systems describable in terms of the same selection
should equal of variables X; moreover the fixed quantities Xx have
the same value xx in each system, while the values
system will of the free variables Xk take on random values xk.
lues for the Generally speaking, the variation of the free varia-
tion for this bles will display a complex interplay of randomness
with correlations stemming from molecular dynam-
ics. One arrives at the simplest theory by considering
(4.9) independent random variables in which correlations
are ignored.38 In the theory of pure randomness the
Gibbs space coupling between systems brings about a total loss
principle of of the "memory" of the state existing before the
very simple coupling was brought about. This point of departure
a reservoir leads to the theory of the statistical effects that take
nique set of place in thermodynamic equilibrium. Accordingly,
that the sets the theory obtained is called the statistical thermo-
dynamics of equilibrium, briefly STE.
variants of a If an ensemble e(xklxx) is in equilibrium with a
is confirmed reservoir R(Trk) to which it is coupled by Xk exchange,
ons imposed the probabilities of the free variables are provided
Jacobian in by the generalized canonical d.f.39
is infinite at 38 To be more precise, the theory does not deal explicitly
with correlations, but these are implicit in the set of fixed
s are inade- variables.39 This result is of course well known and can be safely made
ree variables the point of departure for the following argument. However,
ecause of the we wish to give a few hints concerning a proof that has been
given.3 The derivation in question is based only on qualitative
.te zero the postulates concerning the existence of a d.f. conditioned by
I I_1_IIIPI·__L___YII__sl__l1_l11l^l -.I 4~__ ·--- ·--- · - n (L I__II·L-l--XIIIII_. -
171
'i = - PiT,
LASZLO TISZA
dF(xk,xx,7Tk) = dG(xk,xx) exp [-E r-XkXk]Z (lrk,xx)
(4.10)
The normalization of probabilities leads to
Z(rk,,,xx) = f exp [- r 7kx]dG(xk,xx) . (4.11)
Here, G(xk,XX) is the structure function of the system
and dG denotes the number of microstates within
the range Xk and k + dxk of the free variables. 40 Its
Laplace transform Z is the partition function, or
generating function.
Although the formalism based on (4.10) and
(4.11) is well known, we have some new angles to
emphasize which arise within a systematic discussion
of the three types of measurements that can be
interpreted and evaluated in terms of this formalism:
(A) Coupling of a known system (xx) with a known
environment R(7rk). The predicted response of the
system is the d.f. of Xk, in particular the canonical
average Xk,
(B) Measuring the response xk of a known system
(xx) and inferring the intensities rk of the environ-
ment,
(C) Inferring the nature of an unknown system
(xx) from its response k when coupled to a known
environment R(rTk).
Case (A) corresponds to the standard interpreta-
tion of the formalism. It leads at once to the f.e.
of MTE if
.k = - a In Z/7rk (4.12)
is identified with the corresponding Xk, and the
entropy is defined as
S = s (Xk) , (4.13)
where the random entropy function is
s = In Z + E 7rkxk . (4.14)
Boltzmann's constant is chosen as unity. Thus rela-
tion (4.7) is now replaced by
as(,)/-,k = rk k. (4.15)
the relevant parameters and uninfluenced by previous history.
It is an important point in the present context that the system
that is coupled with the infinite reservoir is not assumed to
have many degrees of freedom and may consist even of a
single particle. The essential idea of the method which is due
to L. Szilard, Z. Physik 32, 735 (1925), is quite out of line with
the usual techniques of statistical mechanics. However, as
shown by B. Mandelbrot, IRE Trans. on Inform. Theory
IT-2, 190, (1956); Ann. Math. Stat. 33, 1021 (1962), it can be
considered as an instance of standard procedures of mathe-
matical statistics.
40 This is a slight modification of terminology introduced by
A. I. Khinchin, Mathematical Foundations of Statistical Me-
chanics, translated by G. Gamow (Dover Publications, New
York, 1949).
The measurement of the xk as a function of the 7rk
allows us to arrive, through integration, at the f.e.
This procedure leaves an integration constant in
the entropy undetermined. This constant is far from
irrelevant and its handling warrants a brief com-
ment. The determination of the constant by the
use of Nernst's law (lim S = 0 for T -- 0) is ob-
jectionable because one cannot be sure (i) whether
the temperature is low enough for the entropy to
vanish, and (ii) whether the system is actually in-
equilibrium. The correct procedure is to calculate
the entropy constant in the ideal gas (low density)
limit with the help of QS. If the results of this very
reliable calculation are combined with the experi-
mental values of the specific heat one obtains S(To),
where To is lowest temperature actually reached.
If this value is practically zero, we have a positive
proof that equilibrium is established. Otherwise,
one of the conditions (i) or (ii) is not satisfied and
the case requires further study.4 '
We turn now to the experimental situation listed
under (B). It was recently recognized by Mandel-
brot 39 that the inversion of the conventional proba-
bilistic problem (A) has an interesting physical
interpretation. Suppose we make a finite number of
measurements of the random variable Xk, say, the
energy. We may use this information to arrive at a
guess concerning the parameters 7rk, in particular,
the temperature of the reservoir with which the
system has been in contact before the measurement
of its energy. This, Mandelbrot points out, is pre-
cisely the problem of thermometry. Although one
usually measures some convenient thermometric
property, this is easily calibrated in terms of the
41 Although the procedure outlined above is well known, the
meaning of Nernst's law as an essential ingredient for the op-
erational definition of equilibrium does not seem to be gen-
erally appreciated. In fact, the third law has been the subject
of an extensive discussion which may have been complicated
by a semantic ambiguity surrounding the term "absolute
entropy." On the one hand, the entropy is "absolute," in the
sense that it involves the entropy constant provided by quan-
tum statistics and not only the empirical entropy differences.
On the other hand, the entropy is relative to the choice of inde-
pendent components. Far from causing difficulties, this cir-
cumstance renders the use of the entropy concept particularly
effective in providing subtle structural information about the
level of equilibrium, whether it is extended to the distribution
of spins, isotopes, molecular orientation, and the like. See F.
Simon, Ergeb. exak. Naturw. 9, 222 (1930); L. Pauling, J.
Am. Chem. Soc. 57, 2680 (1935); K. Clusius, L. Popp, and
A. Frank, Physica 4, 1105 (1937); J. O. Clayton and W. F.
Giauque, J. Am. Chem. Soc. 54, 2610 (1932); F. E. Simon,
"40th Guthrie Lecture," in Year Book of the Physical Society,
1956 (The Physical Society, London, 1957). Of course, an ex-
clusively macroscopic thermodynamics can deal only with
entropy differences. However, such a theory has to accept the
awkward fact that its basic concept, equilibrium, cannot be
put on an operational basis-an impressive case to show that
a theory such as MTE calls for a deeper theory to solve some
of its main problems.
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energy. We note that this formal conception of
thermometry covers also those striking instances of
"measurements" in which, say, the composition of
fossils is used to infer the temperature of the ocean
in early geological times.42
From the formal point of view, the inference from
an observed value of a random variable to the param-
eter of the d.f. is a problem of parameter estimation
which is dealt with in mathematical statistics, some-
-times called also retrodiction.4 3 It is a standard tech-
nique in the evaluation of experiments and will prove
to be an essential ingredient of a realistic theory of
measurement. The suggestion that the methods of
mathematical statistics be used within the context of
basic theory might produce at first blush some ap-
prehension. The inversion of probability calculus is
by no means as unique as, say, the inversion of
differentiation. Hence, the problem of retrodiction is
beset by ambiguities and disputes, involving not only
the choice of mathematical techniques, but also
methodological difficulties centering around the
nature of induction. We hasten to point out that the
uses that we wish to make of estimation theory are
not affected by these difficulties. In fact, our analysis
of situation (C) will lead to a considerable clarifica-
tion of the problem of induction.
Meanwhile we return to the problem of the estima-
tion of the intensities, as it arises, for instance, in
thermometry. The formal aspects of this problem are
very simple. It is satisfactory for our purposes to
consider a single method that is plausible enough on
its own right without requiring for its justification
the technicalities of mathematical statistics and that
yields an intuitive interpretation of known formulas
of statistical mechanics. At the same time, as
Mandelbrot points out, this method is a standard
one in mathematical statistics and is called the
maximization of likelihood.44
Suppose that in a single measurement the free
variables Xk of a system (xx) are observed to have
the values k. (For instance, in the case of ther-
mometry the energy U of the small system, the
thermometer, is found to have the value u.) We
define the estimate 9rk of the unknown intensities 7rk
by the requirement that this choice should maximize
42 H. C. Urey, H. A. Lowenstam, S. Epstein, and C. R.
McKinney, Bull. Geol. Soc. Am. 62, 399 (1951); S. Epstein,
R. Buschbaum, H. A. Lowenstam, and H. C. Urey, ibid.
64, 1315 (1953).
43 This term was used by S. Watanabe, Rev. Mod. Phys.
27, 179 (1955), however, in a sense that is essentially differ-
ent from the above interpretation: Present observations are
used to retrodict past observations.
44 R. A. Fisher, Phil. Trans. Roy. Soc. 222, 309 (1921); R.
A. Fisher, Contributions to Mathematical Statistics, (J. Wiley
& Sons, Inc., New York, 1950).
the probability of the event that has been actually
measured, namely, that the variables Xk of the sys-
tem exhibit the values Xk. This is achieved by maxi-
mizing the logarithm of the probability (10) with
respect to k. The expression In dF, taken as a
function of the rk, is usually called the likelihood
function. This term is meant to be reminiscent of
"probability" without implying that (4.10) is, in
the technical sense, a probability for the parameters
rk. For such an assertion there is no basis and dF
need not even by normalizable in the rk.
We see from (4.10) and (4.14) that the maximiza-
tion of the likelihood function is equivalent to the
minimization of the random entropy S(rk,xk) with
respect to rk. Hence,
[S('I1rk;xk)/3rkk = rj- = 0
or
-(d In Z/OI'k)r, ;k = Xk -
(4.16)
(4.16a)
The left-hand side of this equation is the average
Tk computed with the canonical d.f. belonging to the
intensities 7rk. This result is eminently plausible. We
select those values k which produce a canonical d.f.,
with the average k(1rk) being equal to the single
observed value xk. This procedure leads to consistent
results if the observation is the average of a finite
number of measurements.
The extremal value of the likelihood is a maxi-
mum, the quadratic form, with the matrix elements
d2s d i
d7rid9Ork ark
(4.17)
evaluated for the estimated intensity values ffk, is
positive definite. It can be shown that this condition
is identical to the condition of thermostatic stability
in MTE.
We define now the "estimated entropy"
S(Xk) = min (In Z + E rkxk)
and obtain from (4.14), (4.16), and (4.17)
OS/OXk = k -.
(4.18)
(4.19)
It can be shown that (4.18) and (4.19) form the basis
of a complete formalism of MTE which is an alterna-
tive to (4.14) and (4.15). Moreover, the functional
form of s(xk) is the same as that of S(Xk).
Relation (18) has been used to great advantage
by Fowler 45 and Khinchin. 40 But the formal relation
gains an intuitive interpretation as a maximization
of likelihood.
We see now that the transition from MTE to the
45 R. H. Fowler, Statistical Mechanics (Cambridge University
Press, New York, 1936).
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dominant STE is remarkably simple. The f.e. and
the resulting formalism remain valid, but there is a
change in the conceptual interpretation. More pre-
cisely, we have two conceptual interpretations corre-
sponding to the basic experimental situations (A)
and (B). In the first case we have an ensemble with
definite intensities rk and canonically distributed Xk.
In the second case we have Xk fixed and estimated
intensities ;-k. When Boltzmann's constant goes to
zero (or Avogadro's number to infinity) the two
versions of the f.e degenerate into the single f.e. of
MTE. We have Tk = Xk and rk = ¢rk. Moreover the
requirement for the maximization of likelihood pro-
vides an intuitive interpretation for the basic ex-
tremum postulate of MTE.
We turn now to the third experimental situation
listed above under (C), in which we attempt to
identify an object specified in terms of its fixed
variables xx, assuming that the response k in the
known environment R(7rAk) has been measured. In
this wording the problem greatly exceeds the scope
of the formula (4.10) and it is in this wider sense that
we shall discuss it. We are confronted with the
"problem of object" that is of great practical im-
portance for every experimental science. Neverthe-
less, one might doubt the wisdom of injecting it into
basic theoretical physics, and indeed, this has not
been done up to the present time. The point is that
there is no satisfactory method for estimating the
nature of an object from its observed responses with-
out prior knowledge of the possible set of objects
available for selection. In practice, such prior taxo-
nomical information on possible objects is available
by induction from past experience. However, neither
the justification of induction nor an insight into its
limitation was provided by classical physics. At-
tempts at discussing this problem within the classical
context were abstruse and devoid of interesting re-
sults. The whole question gradually lost respecta-
bility and it seemed to have escaped notice that the
solution of the problem of the existence and observa-
bility of definite objects is implicit in the practical
procedures of quantum physics. We shall attempt to
identify and to formulate explicitly the conceptual
aspects of the theory that are responsible for this
success. We note that this view is the opposite of
the accepted opinion according to which the concept
of object "breaks down" in QM.
The scope of quantum physics is extremely wide.
In keeping with our program of logical differentiation
we ought to subdivide the field into precisely formu-
lated deductive systems. However, this we are not
yet prepared to do. Instead, we shall start by con-
sidering at first a restricted and well-understood part
of the theory and proceed by introducing additional
conceptual elements.
The simplest part of quantum physics that serves
as our point of departure deals with the discrete
stationary states of stable structures of particles
only. We shall refer to this theory briefly as QS. This -
symbol can be read also as "quantum statics" and
should remind one of "thermostatics" rather than of
"mechanical statics." In fact, QS can be conceived-
as the deepening of STE. The concept of "time" plays
a similar, and somewhat rudimentary role in both of
these theories. We shall consider the generalizations
of QS that involve the concept of time in a more
elaborate manner in Sec. IV.D.
We shall list now the features of QS that are
essential for our argument.
(i) QS is a theory of objects, or structures, con-
structed of distinct classes of identical particles.
Within the domain of molecular and low-energy
nuclear chemistry (with the exclusion of : decay),
we have only the three classes of electrons, protons,
and neutrons.
(ii) Both particles and their structures are capable
of existing in pure states represented by state vectors
in Hilbert space, or wave functions specified by a
set of quantum numbers. The pure states represent
potential forms for the existence of objects. If such a
state actually exists, we say the state is occupied, or
realized. The realizations of the same pure state in
different regions of space time form a class of
absolutely identical objects.
(iii) Changes in occupation are called transitions,
in the course of which a formerly occupied state is
annihilated while another one is created. Transitions
give rise to observable effects, the calculation of
which belongs into the time-dependent theory. How-
ever, we anticipate that the predictions of observable
effects are of a statistical nature, and that the proba-
bilities of the random variables which constitute the
measured signal depend parametrically on the quan-
tum numbers of the initial and the final states.
(iv) The time-independent Schr6dinger equation
allows one to compute all pure states that can be
constructed from a given assembly of particles.
(v) Sets of pure states provide so-called mixtures
that can be identified with the ensembles of STE and
hence with the equilibrium states of the systems of
MTE.
Item (v) is parallel to the similar situation in
statistical mechanics, provided that the pure states
are considered as the analogies of the points of r
phase space. However, here the similarity ends, since
_ __ ____  
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items (i) through (iv) are entirely without classical
analog. These are precisely the features that allow
us to put the problem of object on a new firm founda-
tion.
From the philosophical point of view item (iv) is
of the greatest interest. It means that, in principle,
.all of the pure states of structures built from a given
set of particles can be computed on theoretical
grounds without any recourse to experiment! When-
ever this calculation has been actually carried out,
the results have been verified by experiment to a high
accuracy. There are undoubtedly huge classes of
cases in which the same agreement could be achieved,
provided that one over comes the mathematical
difficulties that increase enormously with the com-
plexity of the systems. We may at this point leave
open the question whether or not the scope of QS
extends to systems of all degrees of complexity.
Although the calculation of the properties of pure
states by exclusively theoretical means is of the
greatest interest, it is no less important from the
practical point of view that the taxonomical task of
listing and specifying the set of pure states can be
undertaken by judicious combination of theory and
experiment. In fact, we state: The retrodiction of the
discrete quantum numbers specifying pure states from
the statistical evaluation of actual signals can be carried
out in principle, and very often in practice, with abso-
lute certainty.
The feasibility of this task hinges on items (i)
through (iii). In the first place, the fact that different
representatives of the same pure state are absolutely
identical allows us to repeat the "same" experiment
an unlimited number of times. [Items (i) and (ii).]
Therefore, the statistics of the observed signal [item
(iii)] can be made sufficiently good to resolve the
predictions corresponding to different discrete values
of the parameters to be estimated.
An example is the spectroscopy of a system emit-
ting a line spectrum. Many emission processes take
place between the "same" initial and final states and
yield the "same" emission within the limits of the
line width. The selection rules, particularly in a
magnetic field (Zeeman effect) enable one to analyze
the experimental data to yield the quantum numbers
of the atomic states.
In spectroscopy the statistical element of the pro-
cedure plays a somewhat subordinate role. There-
fore, we mention another case, although it is, strictly
speaking, outside the scope of QS and should be taken
up only in the next section; the problem of determin-
ing the spin, or some other discrete intrinsic property
of a particle from scattering experiments. The tenta-
tive assumptions of different discrete spin values
lead to different theoretical predictions of an observa-
ble signal, say, the angular distribution of scattering.
Since the "same" experiment can be repeated an
indefinite number of times on identical replicas of the
same class, it is, in general, possible to resolve the
different predictions and eliminate all but one of the
competing possibilities.
It is interesting to compare these considerations
with the well-known Bohr-Heisenberg theory of
measurement4 6 which insists that the space-time
specification required by CMP(,4) cannot be achieved
even under ideal conditions in the total absence of
noise, and is limited by the uncertainty principle.
In this context the term "measurement" is not sup-
posed to refer to real measurements, but constitutes
an ingenious conceptual device to clarify the limita-
tions of mechanical models. These considerations are
indispensable whenever such models are used, either
for heuristic purposes or for the intuitive visualiza-
tion of a situation.
In contrast, the present reasoning proposes to sort
out the factors that brought about the extension of
actual experimentation in the microscopic domain.
The performance even of qualitative experiments is
remarkable in view of the fact that this was held to be
impossible as recently as the beginning of this
century. This pessimistic forecast was by no means
unreasonable from the point of view of classical
continuum physics.4 7 The factors that allow us to
make error-free retrodiction from noisy measure-
ments are precisely those discontinuous features of
quantum physics that have no classical analog and
that appeared disruptive within the fabric of con-
tinuum physics.
The essential point is the discovery of the concept
of absolute identity of different replicas realizing the
same pure state. This is in strong contrast with the
concept of identity in common experience. Macro-
scopic objects are never exactly identical. However,
we accept two objects as "identical" in a vague sort
of way if we cannot discern any difference between
them, or if their differences are within specifications.
Hence the "identity" of common experience is a
concept that is only meaningful relative to the pre-
cision of measurement or to conventional specifica-
tion. Alleging the identity of two objects within
46 Niels Bohr, Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature,
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 1934).
47 If the apparent continuity of the laws governing the be-
havior of macroscopic objects would extend to the micro-
scopic domain, we could infer nothing about the properties of
single atoms by coupling them to macroscopic measuring de-
vices.
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continuum physics would seem merely to admit one's
inability to discern the existing differences.
We may sum up the situation by saying that QS
contains rigorous results of a taxonomical character
concerning the existence of classes and their proper-
ties which are entirely foreign to classical physics.
Remembering from Sec. II that dominant systems
have their characteristic invariance property, we
say that the absolute identity of any realization of
the same pure state is the dominant invariance of
QS, to be referred to as morphic invariance. It is the
morphic invariance that brings it about that com-
plex systems of well-defined identity can be built in
nature through the mechanism of random processes.
Up to this point we have referred to the quantum
numbers only as identifying tags. We now give a
short summary of their physical meaning. The first
step in describing a finite stable structure is the
establishment of an orthogonal set of energy eigen-
states. If macroscopic translation is separated off,
this spectrum is discrete, and falls within our defini-
tion of QS. The knowledge of the number of states
gi, having the energy eigenvalue Ei, provides us with
the structure function and leads to the general
formalism of STE.
The actual calculation of gi is based on a specifi-
cation of the additional quantum numbers. First
we consider the quantum numbers associated with
the total angular momentum and one of its com-
ponents. The dynamic interpretation suggested by
this designation establishes a connection with CMP.
It is important to realize however, that these quan-
tum numbers admit also an intuitive geometrical
interpretation in terms of the shape of the wave
function. The idea of this geometrical interpretation
ties in with the "morphic" aspect of QS emphasized
above. The geometrical representation of the shape
of the wave function4 8 is more realistic and is also a
more intuitive picture of stationary atomic states
than the historically motivated tracing of planetary
orbits.
The morphic effects associated with angular mo-
mentum are geometrically represented in terms of
the spherical harmonics. The same functions arise
also in the classical vibration of macroscopic objects.
It should be emphasized, therefore, that morphic
invariance does not extend to macroscopic vibration.
The difference becomes evident in terms of the radial
functions. In the case of the hydrogen atom the scale
of the radial function, say, the location of its first
maximum, is expressed in terms of universal con-
48 H. E. White, Introduction to Atomic Spectra (McGraw-
Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1934), pp. 143 and 146.
stants; it constitutes a significant scientific statement
concerning the class of all hydrogen atoms. In con-
trast, the scale of the radial wave function of a
macroscopic object specifies only one individual
object, it is not a significant scientific statement.
The importance of the morphic interpretation of
the angular momentum is further underlined by the
existence of such nonclassical integrals as parity and
statistics,4 9 which have no classical dynamic analog.
but which admit a morphic interpretation in a-
fashion quite similar to angular momentum.
Finally, we turn to the discussion of the parameters
that specify the configurations of molecules. The last
term is meant here in a generic sense, it includes
macromolecules and macroscopic objects also. These
parameters specifying configuration are often ac-
cepted as classical ones, since they can be visualized
in terms of localized potentials. However, these
potentials have a phenomenological character (PhCM
of Sec. IV.B) and cannot be classified among the
dynamical integrals of CMP(,). We claim that the
parameters describing localization are expressions
of the morphic aspects of QS on a molecular and
macroscopic level. In fact, the quantum effects in-
volved in these discussions can become quite subtle
and are still incompletely understood in some mar-
ginal, but presumably not unimportant, cases.
The problem of molecular configurations was first
solved in great generality by Born and Oppen-
heimer, 50 who initiated the method usually referred
to as the adiabatic approximation. Consider an
assembly of electrons and invariant nuclei. The
Schrddinger equation of the system is derived, as
usual, from the Hamiltonian; we shall call it more
specifically the particle Hamiltonian, a function of
the coordinates and momenta of the particles:
H = T + Te + V(x,X), (4.20)
where Tn and T, are the nuclear and the electronic
kinetic energy, and V the total potential energy; x
and X represent all of the electronic and nuclear co-
ordinates, respectively.
The method exploits the large mass ratio of nuclei
49 The term "statistics" is a misnomer. It would be more
logical to say that bosons and fermions have an even and odd
permutational parity, respectively, thus emphasizing the ob-
vious analogy with the conventional inversion parity, a sym-
metry property. To be sure, permutational parity affects the
statistical properties of many-particle systems. However, this
effect is largest at absolute zero where the system is in a single
state and there is no statistical situation in the proper sense
of the word. The distinction between even and odd permuta-
tional parity disappears in the high-temperature, low-density
limit. where the important effect is statistics.
50 M. Born and J. R. Oppenheimer, Ann. Physik 84, 457(1927).
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and electrons. As a first step we solve the electronic
problem at fixed nuclear positions. We can think of
situation as being brought about by letting the
nuclear masses tend to infinity implying that T.
tends to zero. The Schr6dinger equation in this case
is
(T. + V)>(x,X) = W(X)O(x,X), (4.21)
where the eigenvalue W and the eigenfunction 0
depend parametrically on the fixed nuclear con-
figuration X. We confine our attention to the
neighborhood of the configuration X° for which the
lowest eigenvalue has a stable minimum. Further,
we assume that in this neighborhood the lowest
eigenvalue W ° (X°) is nondegenerate. 5 ' We return to
the justification and limitation of this assumption
below.
The solutions of the original problem of finite
nuclear masses is sought in the form
H0(x,X)a,,,(X) = E,,(x,X)L,,8(X), (4.22)
where the eigenfunctions a,, of the nuclear motion
satisfy to a good approximation the equation
fns- = Entna (4.23)
with
g = T + W 0(X). (4.24)
Evidently (23) has the form of a Schr6dinger
equation for the nuclear motion alone. The electrons
that convey the binding appear only implicitly in the
"potential" W° (X). We shall refer to C as the quasi-
Hamiltonian. In spite of its formal analogy with the
particle Hamiltonian H, there are differences that
are fundamental for the present argument. Although
the transition from H to C involve a number of
approximations, a matter to which we shall return,
it would be nevertheless misleading to conceive of
this transition merely as the substitution of a rigorous
formalism by an approximate one. Instead, we pro-
pose to think of the procedure as52 a transformation
between formalisms of different types. While the
particle Hamiltonian is firmly rooted in mechanics,
the quasi-Hamiltonian has direct ties with the
thermodynamic description of the system.5 3 H is a
mechanical concept inherited from CMP, it is ex-
51 We exclude even an approximate degeneracy, i.e., the
lowest excited level W' (X) should be much higher than the
nuclear energies En of (4.22).
52 The existence of spin casts doubt on the point of view
that would consider the Schrddinger equation derived from(4.20) as the absolutely correct statement of the problem.
The correct account of the spin requires a relativistic treat-
ment, and it would seem to be impossible to keep out the
complications of relativistic field theory.
53 In Sec. IV.A we formulated the program of finding the
pressed in terms of the coordinates of all of the
particles. This is no longer true of aC. Not only have
the electronic coordinates been eliminated, but the
nuclear coordinates appear in such collective terms
as Eulerian angles and normal coordinates of the
vibration around an equilibrium. The existence of an
equilibrium configuration brings it about that 5C has
geometrical symmetries; a point group for molecules
and a space group for crystals, whereas the particle
Hamiltonian has only the permutational symmetry,
if we ignore the translation and rotation of the system
as a whole. A single-particle Hamiltonian may gener-
ate a huge number of quasi-Hamiltonians. Consider,
say, an assembly of a large number of carbon and
hydrogen atoms. There are thousands of ways of
combining these into molecules, each of which is
described by its own quasi-Hamiltonian. It is the
Schrddinger equation based on 3C that leads to the
relevant structure function and to the fundamental
equation of STE and MTE. In particular, the con-
figurational symmetry of the quasi-Hamiltonian is
essential for the derivation of the phase rules.2
A final statement to round out the usefulness of the
adiabatic method is that the quasi-Hamiltonian and
its energy spectrum can be empirically determined
from spectroscopic data.
We turn now to a critical discussion of our assump-
tion that the lowest electronic state associated with
equilibrium configuration X is nondegenerate. A
systematic reason for degeneracy would arise only
for symmetric configurations. However, the Jahn-
Teller theorem54 assures us that degenerate states of
nonlinear polyatomic molecules are unstable with
respect to deformation of the symmetric configura-
tion that removes the degeneracy. For this reason,
the assumption of the absence of degeneracy in the
adiabatic approximation would seem to be generally
justified. There are nevertheless exceptional situa-
tions that require an essential deepening of the theory.
It may happen that an unstable symmetric configura-
tion splits into, say, two configurations of lower
symmetry which are separated only by a potential
barrier that is sufficiently low to permit a quantum-
mechanical resonance between these states. Thus we
are led to the entirely novel situation of having a
resonance between two quasi-Hamiltonians, the so-
called dynamic Jahn-Teller effect.5 5 Even though the
qualitative differences between the mechanical and the
thermodynamic viewpoints. A partial answer to this question
is implicit in the relation of H and c.
54 H. A. Jahn and E. Teller, Proc. Roy. Soc. (London) A164
117 (1938).
55 See W. Moffitt and A. D. Liehr, Phys. Rev. 106, 1195
(1957); W. Moffitt and W. Thorson, ibid. 108, 1251 (1957);
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occurrence of this phenomenon is rather exceptional,
it indicates that the existence of the quasi-Hamil-
tonian (4.24), and the corresponding Schr6dinger
equation for nuclear motion must not be taken for
granted.
D. Dynamics of Structures
The "static" theories MTE, STE, and QS that
deal with problems of structure have their "dy-
namic," or "kinetic" counterparts MTD, STD, and
QD. In the block diagram (Fig. 1) the symbols of
these systems are in broken rectangles to indicate
that they are still essentially incomplete. In particu-
lar, QD is supposed to be a dominant theory in
which the conceptual aspects of QS and of RM are
brought in harmony with each other. The value of
the present method will be ultimately judged by its
success, or the lack of it, in bringing about such a
dominant theory. Meanwhile we shall merely sketch
a few ideas that can be discussed at the present status
of the theory.
It is indicative of the difficulties of the dynamics of
structures that even the traditional dichotomy be-
tween statics and dynamics is an oversimplification.
The static theories have significant temporal aspects
and the transition to dynamics requires a number of
distinct steps, each of which leads to a deepening of
the existing theories. The eventual situation will be
presumably analogous to, even though more com-
plicated than, the logical fine structure of CED
represented in Fig. 2. Mechanistic analogies are of
little help in disentagling this situation. In the first
place, CMP has no significant static limit, since
time-independent conditions can be maintained only
in the trivial case of systems consisting of noninter-
acting particles.56 Second, the concept of time in
CMP plays the same standard role in all conceivable
problems, a deceptive simplicity that is in strong
contrast with the multiplicity of roles played by the
concept of time in thermodynamics and quantum
mechanics. We shall occasionally refer to these theo-
ries by the generic name quantum thermodynamics.
This term is to denote a whole cluster of deductive
systems, the most important of which are still in-
H. C. Longuet-Higgins and K. L. McEwen, J. Chem. Phys.
26, 719 (1957); H. C. Longuet-Higgins, U. Opik, M. H. L.
Pryce, and R. A. Sack, Proc. Roy Soc. (London) A244, 1
(1958); A. D. Pierce, "Electron Lattice Interaction and Gen-
eralized Born-Oppenheimer Approximation," Ph.D. Thesis
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, January 1962 (un-
published).
56 This statement is not inconsistent with the existence of
mechanical statics but points once more to the semantic con-
fusion surrounding the term "mechanics." The statics in
question belongs to PhCM rather than to CMP (see Sec. IV.B).
complete. The diversity of the temporal processes in
these theories leads to a greatly increased flexibility
in the representation of reality, the ramifications of
which are far from being fully explored.
We shall concentrate on two closely related issues
and emphasize a duality that is characteristic of
quantum thermodynamics and is in contrast with
mechanistic monism. This means that we claim an
independent status for pairs of concepts when the,
mechanistic philosophy calls for a reduction of one'
to the other. The first duality is that of two principles
of causality, while the second contrasts energetic
and entropic processes.
The great predictive success of CMP and of CED
has led to the conviction that all causal chains in
nature are accounted for by differential equations
and rely on the complete specification of the initial
state of the system. Actually in thermodynamics we
encounter another situation in which causal chains
are determined by a selective specification of the
initial conditions. We shall speak of a second principle
of causality based on selective memory, that is to be
distinguished from the first principle of causality
based on exhaustive memory.27
As a convenient point of departure we consider the
composite systems of MTE. We have seen in Sec.
IV.C that the concept of thermodynamic operations,
followed by entropic processes triggered by these
operations, implicitly contains an element of tem-
poral sequence. Such sequences can be repeated
to form what we shall call composite (entropic)
processes. Due to the fact that the principle of
thermostatic determinism assures us of the unique-
ness of the final state of each step, the entire com-
posite process assumes a deterministic character,
provided that the operations are preset by some
automatic device. Alternatively, if the operations are
governed by the terminal states through feedback,
the composite process becomes goal directed. Of
course, while composite processes consist of tempo-
rally ordered sequences, they lack a definite time
scale as long as one is confined to using MTE. An
important step toward providing a time scale is
achieved in MTD in which the approach to equi-
librium appears as a relaxation process characterized
by definite relaxation times. However, in a purely
macroscopic theory the completion of a relaxation
process requires an infinite amount of time. This
57 This terminology would be ambiguous in the case of the
systems with "real" memory, that is, for computers and or-
ganisms. These have been, of course, tacitly excluded thus far,
but we shall briefly discuss them in the next section.
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difficulty is finally removed in STD. In this theory
equilibrium includes thermal noise and a process
terminates in a finite stretch of time as the static
equilibrium is approached within the average noise
level.
The composite entropic processes provide ex-
.amples for the second principle of causality and we
shall describe in some detail the distinction between
selective and exhaustive memory. The first aspect of
selectivity is that a system may be coupled to its
environment by the exchange of energy and matter,
and yet it suffices to specify the environment in
terms of a few intensity parameters. This specifica-
tion is adequate to determine the effect of the envi-
ronment on the state of the system, although it
would have to be enormously increased to satisfy
mechanical requirements according to CMP(q) or
even QM. However, this additional detail is ir-
relevant in the sense that it has no effect on the
observed behavior of the system. The second aspect
of selectivity is that the variables of the system are
classified into free and fixed variables. Simple as this
idea is, it is highly nonmechanical, since in CMP(M)
the energy of an isolated system in rest is the only
invariant, apart from the particles the invariance of
which has been postulated. The role of the fixed
variables is to identify the system. In particular, the
fixed variables along with the intensities of the
environment determine the probability distribution
function of the free variables. If some of the con-
straints imposed on the system are relaxed, the
entropic process triggered by this operation brings
about the loss of the memory of the formerly fixed
variables. This loss of memory is a prerequisite for
the uniqueness of the final equilibrium.
Whereas the first two aspects of selectivity empha-
size the constructive role of "forgetting," the third
aspect deals with the persistency of the values of the
fixed variables. We emphasize that the actual preser-
vation of the fixed variables under realistic "noisy"
conditions, as a result of quantum-mechanical
stability, is physically meaningful. This is in con-
trast with the exhaustive but fragile memory of the
initial state in CMP(,4) that is so often erased by the
slightest perturbation and is denied physical mean-
ing by the principle of regularity. It takes only some
reflection to realize that the existence of identifiable
objects, which respond in a predictable fashion under
"identical" conditions, depends on the second princi-
ple of causality; the object is permanent within its
lifetime and the conditions are identical only because
the relevant specification is selective.
We are now in a position to clarify the relation of
causality and determinism. In common parlance
these terms suggest different meanings, and indeed
we can provide distinct interpretations for them in
the thermodynamic theory. The choice of thermody-
namic operations that govern the composite process
may, or may not, depend on our decision, and ac-
cordingly we may speak either of causal or determin-
istic chains of events. The former would arise in
experiments, the latter, say, in the astronomical
setting, or in the evolution of an organism deter-
mined by the genetic code. Of course, the delimita-
tion of the two situations is by no means fixed, but
shifts with the advances of experimental techniques.
In order to complete the description of real situa-
tions, we have to supplement entropic composite
processes with energetic ones. Since unbalanced
forces produce accelerations, these processes can be
treated in MTE or STE only in the limiting case for
which the accelerations are negligible. It is interesting
that entropic processes are not subject to such a
restriction, their treatment is perfectly germane to
the equilibrium theories.58 As soon as accelerations
are admitted, we have to use a dynamic theory. The
problem is complicated by the fact that energetic
processes are almost always tied up with entropic
processes, and it is, in fact, the interplay of the two
that is our main concern in the present context. This
problem presents itself in the sharpest form within
quantum mechanics and this is the only approach
that we wish to consider here. 9
In quantum mechanics energetic processes are
described in terms of the time-dependent Schr6dinger
equation that implies the temporal evolution of the
58 This is in contrast with the usual contention that thermo-
statics deals with reversible processes and irreversible thermo-
dynamics with irreversible ones.
59 A few parenthetical remarks concerning the role of en-
ergetic and entropic processes in MTE and STE are meant
only to outline the meaning of some of our terms by linking
them with traditional designations. The hydrodynamics of
ideal fluids and the phenomenological theory of relaxation
processes are limiting cases of MTD which deal with energetic
and entropic processes, respectively. The theory of Markov
chains is a limiting case of STD dealing with entropic proc-
esses. This is essentially an instance of mathematical prob-
ability theory in which the postulated probabilities for ele-
mentary events allow us to compute probabilities of complex
events (that is, sets of chains of elementary events). There are
many phenomenological theories, such as the hydrodynamics
of viscous fluids and thermohydrodynamics, that deal with
the joint effects of energetic and entropic processes. These
theories are important from the practical point of view but
provide little fundamental insight. A much more detailed de-
scription of the interplay of energetic and entropic processes
for a particularly simple type of system is provided by the
Boltzmann equation of the kinetic theory of gases. The
achievement of this theory is somewhat obscured by the fact
that, according to the tradition set by Boltzmann the aim is a
rigorous derivation of this equation from Liouville's equation.
In other words, in conformity with the mechanistic program
one proposes to reduce entropic processes to energetic ones
(Boltzmann's problem).
-- 1111---
179
LASZLO TISZA
wave function in terms of a unitary transformation
4(t) = U(t - to)4#(to) . (4.25)
The conservation of entropy appears as the uni-
tary invariance of the number of dimensions of the
subspaces of Hilbert space spanned by the state
function or, more generally, by the density matrix.
Another aspect of the entropy conservation is the
maintenance of strict phase relations, a characteristic
property of wave propagation in continuous media.
Accordingly, we shall briefly refer to energetic
processes as propagations. Of course, in the case of
stationary states the phase does not propagate, but
varies synchronously over all space.
We introduce now the concept of events to denote:
(i) transitions between stationary discrete quantum
states, (ii) interaction processes described in terms
of the S-matrix formalism, including the events of
high-energy physics. In all of these cases we have the
same type of situation as in a chemical reaction.6 0 An
initially existing state disappears, whereas another
state appears. This is described formally in terms of
annihilation and creation operators. The difference
between quantum events and chemical reactions is
that the former are the elementary indivisible con-
stituents out of which chemical reactions and, more
generally, entropic processes, are constructed. Quan-
tum events exhibit in a particularly clean-cut fashion
the characteristic features (selective memory) of
entropic processes that we have summed up under
the designation of the second principle of causality.
First, there is the peculiar persistency of quantum
states. As long as the system is in a particular pure
state, the corresponding quantum numbers have the
character of fixed variables. Also the negative aspect
of the selectivity of memory is very significant. A
system in a pure state does not "remember" where
it came from, nor the instant when the transition
into the state occurred; pure states do not "age,"
although they have a definite lifetime. All of these
factors are essential prerequisites of the morphic
invariance of the pure state which, in turn, ensures
error-free retrodiction, as we have already seen.
Events bring about a measure of randomization of
the phase relations. The random aspect of events
stems from the unpredictability of the instant at
which an individual event is initiated. Otherwise, of
course, events are by no means so unstructured as,
say, the steps of the "random-walk" problem. Since
their description consists in the specification of the
initial and final states, events have their individual
60 A. Einstein, Verhandl. deut. Physik Ges. 16, 820 (1914).
characteristics just as the states involved have.
The instant of an event is in some respects analo-
gous to the instant of an operation that triggers an
entropic process, although without any subject or
even a molecular device as a catalyst, to perform the
operation. At the same time genuine operations in-
volving manipulations of the boundary conditions
also have their legitimate role in quantum mechanics.
In particular, relaxation of an internal constraint in.
a composite system changes the basic set of eigen-'
functions of the system. Therefore, even while the
wave function is instantaneously unchanged, the
result is the creation of a huge number of phase
relations. Subsequently these are destroyed in a
series of events that constantly interrupt the propa-
gations. This is the mechanism by which the entropy
increases.
It is obvious that both propagations and events
are indispensable for a descriptive account of quan-
tum phenomena, and both concepts are essential
ingredients of the formalism. This is particularly
evident in the perturbation expansion in which
propagations and events appear intertwined. From
the formal point of view, this technique can be
considered as the generalization of the basic problem
of mathematical probability theory. Again the proba-
bility of complex events is computed from that of
elementary events. However, the theory operates in
terms of probability amplitudes rather than in terms
of probabilities. This conceptual shift is comparable
to the one that is instrumental in effecting the transi-
tion from MTE to STE. Once more the theory is
deepened, our probabilities are now capable of
interference, in other words, stochastic events can
be combined with propagations expressed in terms
of differential equations. Whereas entropic processes
cannot be joined to CMP without disrupting the
formalism, energetic processes can be joined to this
modified probability theory.
Potentially we have a most harmonious corre-
spondence between theory and experiment. However,
these potentialities are only incompletely realized in
the existing presentations of quantum mechanics.
There are two major reasons for this situation. First,
there is the more or less accidental historical link
between quantum mechanics and CMP(Iu) which
induces us to assign a privileged status to propaga-
tions over events. The rule that requires the reduc-
tion of events to propagations has been transferred
from CMP(/u) to quantum mechanics, even though
the reasons for this program that were imperative in
the mechanistic scheme do not prevail in quantum
thermodynamics. The fact that the rule is often
__ I _I I _ ___ _
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broken or circumvented does not reestablish logical
clarity. The second, and deeper reason is that the
theory in which events and propagations are freely
compounded for the construction of complex events
is, in spite of important achievements, still in an in-
complete state. This is particularly true of that part
of quantum thermodynamics which we have called
QD in the block diagram. The present method of
,analysis enables us to dispose of the first of these
-difficulties and, by sorting out the elements of the
situation, we hope to prepare the ground for attack-
ing the second.
It is well known that the propagations (4.25) are
insufficient to account for all of the coupling effects
of quantum mechanics, and the processes of measure-
ment have to be joined as independent conceptual
entities, a point expressed with particular precision
by von Neumann.6 ' We claim that the present sug-
gestion of supplementing propagations by events as
irreducible primitive concepts is the generalization
of the traditional view. The crucial point is that many
events are measurable. Atomic physics became possi-
ble because of the discovery of a long line of devices,
from scintillation counters to bubble chambers, that
enable us to retrodict events from observed signals.
However, events occur whether or not we observe
them. Therefore, the supplementation of propaga-
tions cannot be relegated to a special class of studies
devoted to the theory of measurement, but such
additional elements have to be standard parts of the
formalism. This point of view enables us to avoid
some of the paradoxes that arise from the overempha-
sis of the subjective elements in the quantum for-
malism. As an example of this sort we consider, with
von Neumann, the transformation of a pure state
into a mixture of increased entropy because of the
coupling with a measuring device. A typical appa-
ratus would be a screen with a number of slits and a
counting device in the path of the beam of particles.
In our language, we consider the coupling with the
measuring device a thermodynamic operation in
which certain constraints are enforced.6 2 In this pro-
cedure the splitting of the beam is a propagation, the
absorption or scattering in the counter at a location
corresponding to a particular split beam is an event
in which one state is actualized to the exclusion of
other potentialities. 3
61 J. von Neumann, Mathematische Grundlagen der Quan-
tenmechanik, (Verlag Julius Springer, Berlin, 1932), Chap. V.
62 Note that in systems in equilibrium considered in MTE
the enforcement of a constraint produces no entropy increase.
The present case is different, since we start from a pure state,
a nonequilibrium situation.
63 This collapse of the wave function is a standard occur-
rence and is the inevitable consequence of the fact that the
In the course of this process the assembly of
particles making up the beam is transformed from a
pure state into a mixture with a corresponding in-
crease of entropy. We have said nothing, thus far,
of measurement. However, if the events are observed
and recorded, we have gained information, this gain
can be considered as partially balancing the increase
of entropy.6 4 Thus measurement is associated with
an increase of information, whereas the parallel in-
crease in entropy takes place independently of any
subjective act of measurement. We add that the
typical entropy increases of MTE arise in the course
of relaxations rather than of enforcement of con-
straints.
The suggested new relation between propagations
and events raises a number of problems that have to
be solved before the theory can be reconstructed
along the lines indicated. A problem of paramount
importance concerns the validity of the Schrddinger
equation. In the traditional theory it is often taken
for granted that the Schr6dinger equation is entirely
correct and contains all legitimate quantum-mechani-
cal information about systems of any complexity. 5
How is this statement modified by the fact that
events are accorded an independent status? We pro-
pose the tentative rule that the results deduced from
the Schrddinger equation are correct whenever they
satisfy the principle of regularity (see Sec. II). This
principle infringes sufficiently on the validity of
(4.25) to allow us to join entropic processes to the
formalism without in any way impairing its con-
sistency. We shall apply the principle of regularity
to both of the abovementioned criteria, of entropy
conservation.
The most obvious infringement of the definiteness
of results of (4.25) arises in case of degeneracy. Con-
sider, for instance, a time-independent Hamiltonian.
The eigenfunctions of this operator should be con-
stant for eigenfunctions associated with nondegener-
wave function has a dual reference to classes and to individual
systems. Events refer to an individual "choice" out of the set
of possibilities determined by the evolution of the wave func-
tion of the class. This duality is foreshadowed in MTE, the
formalism of which deals with the state of normal equilibrium
to which an actual system may, or may not, conform. The
widespread reluctance to make full use of the collapse of the
wave function is sufficiently explained by the fact that this
phenomenon seems paradoxical in terms of the classical frame-
work of CMP and CED or if one attempts to interpret the
Schr6dinger equation as a classical wave equation.
64 L. Szilard, Z. Physik 53, 840 (1929); L. Brillouin, ref-
erence 10, Chap. 13.
65 The attitude reflected in this assumption is obviously the
same one that generated similarly sweeping claims for the
formalism of CMP(M). It would be tempting to subject this
claim to critical analysis that could center around the un-
certainties in the choice of the appropriate Hamiltonian dis-
cussed at the end of Sec. IV.C. However, the line of thought
pursued above is more constructive at this juncture.
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ate eigenvalues. However, in the case of degeneracy
this result is upset even by the smallest perturbation.
Hence, the principle of regularity requires that the
implications of the strictly deterministic conclusions
of (4.25) should not be considered physically mean-
ingful in this case. Thus there arises a gap that is
filled by the random events resulting in entropic
processes.
We consider now the entropy conservation of
energetic processes in terms of the criterion of co-
herent phase relations. If Eq. (4.25) is taken seriously
as an entirely rigorous description of the system, such
coherent phase relations would extend over infinite
space-time. In reality, however, coherence can be
expected to prevail only in a finite space-time do-
main. In many simple problems involving, say, a
single collision, this artificial extension of the range
of coherence is a harmless idealization. Not so in
composite processes, for which the extent of coher-
ence is often significant and should not be sum-
marily decided by postulate without specific exami-
nation. In composite systems, the interruption of
coherence occurs at the walls constituting the cell
boundaries. However, just as phase boundaries play
the role of "natural" walls, it seems that wave func-
tions corresponding to pure states have their "natu-
ral" space-time extension of coherence. Such in-
trinsically coherent units should become basic entities
of the suggested theory. They are to be joined to each
other either incoherently or coherently.
We turn now to the discussion of the well-known
controversy between Einstein and Bohr5 concerning
the desirable and attainable features of quantum
mechanics. The essence of this argument is the
compatibility of causality with a complete space-time
description of systems. Bohr emphasized the com-
plementarity of the two descriptions, whereas Ein-
stein held up CMP(A) and CED as ideal theories in
which the two requirements are entirely compatible.
Accordingly, the argument always turned around the
point, whether or not quantum mechanics could be
cast into a form that agrees more closely with the
structure of the classical theory.
This argument has been deadlocked for a long time.
We propose that the reason for this impasse is that
both participants tacitly assumed that there is only
one type of causality depending on the exhaustive
specification of the initial conditions. In contrast,
we have argued that most of the causal chains ex-
pressing the regularities in nature are of a second kind
and are based on the selective specification of com-
posite processes in composite systems. Although the
quantum thermodynamics of these systems is still
to be developed in a systematic manner, there seems
to be no incompatibility between the piecewise con-
tinuous space-time description of these systems and
the existence of causal chains depending on selective
specification. An exacting test for such a view is the
development of theoretical constructs that are to
represent the behavior of living organisms.
E. Physics of Organisms
Living organisms exhibit complex morphological-
and functional properties that are very different from
the properties of systems investigated in physics.
Nevertheless, physics is supposed to have a funda-
mental character and it is a widely entertained hope
that in some sense, still to be clarified, biology is
reducible to physics. Let us assume that physics
reaches a degree of development in which the princi-
ples governing the building of complex structures
from elementary entities is well-enough understood.
In this not unlikely situation we should be able to
synthetize also the conceptual material that is
necessary for the understanding of the properties of
structures of increasing complexity. For nuclei,
atoms, and molecules this has already been achieved
to a not inconsiderable degree. According to the
point of view that is optimistic with respect to the
reducibility of biology, this gradual extension of our
understanding need not stop at any sharp boundary
separating inanimate and living objects. We may set
aside the more speculative aspects of this question
by appraising the scope and limitations of the re-
ducibility program at three stages of development of
the physics of structures: (i) mechanistic physics
based on CMP(u), (ii) traditional quantum me-
chanics, and (iii) the quantum thermodynamics of
composite systems outlined in Sec. IV.E.
The discussion based on CMP(t,) is only of histori-
cal interest. The obvious failure of this discipline to
account for anything resembling an organism pro-
duced a strong case for vitalism, a doctrine that
postulates ad hoc, irreducible, vital forces to fill the
gap left by mechanistic physics. This argument can
now be dismissed as inconclusive, since not even
phenomenological mechanics is "mechanistic" in
this technical sense of the word (see Sec. IV.B). This
state of affairs changed radically with the develop-
ment of quantum mechanics and the subsequent
clarification of chemical stability and reactivity. In
the terminology of Sec. IV.C we may say that the
morphic invariance of QS provides at least the
prerequisites for the explanation of the morphological
aspects of biology. If, in addition, we remember the
recent spectacular advances of molecular biology it
_ __ __
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seems hard to maintain an attitude that would hold
any specific aspect of biology as out of bounds for
physical-chemical investigations. At the same time,
we are still far from a satisfactory solution of the
reduction problems, the scope and limitations of
which we shall attempt to spell out as follows. Re-
' duction seems to proceed most satisfactorily with
respect to problems "in the small," whereas it has
,not even started for problems "in the large." This
contrast between the "atomistic" and "holistic"
attitudes of physics and biology is well known, it is
the real stumbling block of the reduction program.
It is our contention that this inability to cope with
problems of organization is only a property of
mechanistic physics, rather than of physics in
general. In particular, this limitation, still present
in traditional quantum mechanics, stems from the
historical link with CMP(M) (see Secs. IV.C and
IV.D). While a huge amount of detail remains to
be worked out, it seems that the quantum thermo-
dynamics of composite systems has the necessary
flexibility to account for the holistic problems of
organisms.
We note that this theory incorporates a number of
concepts that are evidently indispensable for any
theory of organisms. We have the distinction be-
tween free and fixed variables, processes and opera-
tions; processes are controlled by fixed variables,
whereas the fixed variables are changed by operations
or parametric processes. The combination of proc-
esses and operations leads to the concept of composite
processes and to the second principle of causality,
which depend on selective specification of the initial
conditions. In MTE one usually considers composite
systems consisting of two subsystems. However, the
complexity of composite systems can be increased in
a variety of ways. The first step is to increase the
number of subsystems, then, by appropriate con-
nections, couplings may be introduced between any
two of them, not necessarily adjacent in space. The
result may be an entity with complex topological
. properties. The restrictivity of these connections may
be regulated, just as chemical reactions are cata-
lyzed, or poisoned. The system reaches a measure of
autonomy if the entire control system is operated
automatically by feedback from the environment
and/or the state of the system. The second principle
of causality ensures a mixed causal, stochastic re-
sponse of the system. For systems of a certain com-
plexity the code containing the instructions for its
response may become rather complex and be in need
of logical organization to ensure a reasonably unique
operation. The logical structure of the block diagram
(Fig. 1) exhibits one possibility of a consistent organi-
zation of a complex logical structure in which poten-
tial inconsistencies among different sets of instruc-
tions are kept under control. A further step leading
toward complexity is that composite systems are
united into a supersystem. The coupling may involve
the exchange of additive invariant and/or the ex-
change of information. All this can be repeated to
yield a complicated hierarchy of structures.
Beyond a certain complexity the code of instruc-
tions plays the role of a rudimentary "mind." More-
over, the logical structure of this mind and the
physical structure of the system attuned to each
other for smooth functioning are expressions of a
psychophysical parallelism.
Summing up, we may say that the basic problem
of the physics of organism is to establish the con-
nection between the built-in patterns of constraint
and freedom on the one hand, and the functioning
of the organism on the other. This concept of con-
straint and freedom is entirely foreign to CMP(,u),
but is present in all aspects of quantum thermody-
namics. In fact, these concepts are present even in
PhCM. This is the conceptual basis of the fact that
machines such as automata and computers can simu-
late certain functions of organisms. By providing
standardized interchangeable parts, the makers of
the machines imitate the morphic invariance of
nature. This imitation can never reach the perfection
of the original, and jamming and overheating cer-
tainly set a limit to the complexity of devices made
out of macromechanical elements.
V. PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS
The method of analysis of this paper is, I believe,
in agreement with the spirit and the underlying goals
of the philosophical school that is alternately called
analytic, positivist, or empirical. I hope not to be
too far off the mark in using these terms as syno-
nyms.
The concepts of logical differentiation and integra-
tion arose within the examination of the language of
physics, which is a legitimate pursuit in this school
of thought.
A point of agreement is the close attention paid to
empirical requirements; more specifically, the ap-
proach to quantum physics as described in Sec. IV
is quite in line with the positivist program of develop-
ing the theory of the structure of matter in close
parallel with experiment.
Moreover, the principle of regularity (Sec. II) is a
methodological rule that serves as a safeguard against
-I-- I-
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taking theoretical systems more seriously than their
empirical support warrants.
At the same time, the present paper and its impli-
cations are at variance with some of the current
practices of positivism. The clarification of these
issues can be achieved as a by-product of the present
analysis.
Let us consider first the so-called operational
character of the theoretical concepts. It goes without
saying that the deductive systems of physics have
to have a range of concordance with experience.
Yet, there is a growing awareness of the fact that
there is something wrong, or at least lopsided, about
the great emphasis on "operationalism" which for
several decades has dominated empirical philosophy.
We could do hardly better than quote from Bridg-
man's66 penetrating reappraisal of the early ideas of
operationalism. "If I were writing the 'Logic' today
I would change the emphasis so as to try to avoid
what I regard as the one most serious misunderstand-
ing. That is, I would emphasize more that the opera-
tions in terms of which a physical concept receives
its meaning need not be, and as a matter of fact are
not, exclusively the physical operations of the labora-
tory. The mistaken idea that the operations have to
be physical or instrumental, combined with the
dictum . . . , 'The concept is synonymous with the
corresponding set of operations,' has in some cases
led to disastrous misunderstanding. If I were writing,
again I would try to emphasize more the importance
of the mental or paper-and-pencil operations. Among
the very most important of the mental operations
are the verbal operations. These play a much greater
role than I realized at the time...."
The analytic definitions of the present approach
are of course "paper-and-pencil" operations. Apart
from being of equal importance with the instrumental
operations, the two are related to each other in a
well-structured manner. In the absence of precise
analytic definitions the meaning of the instrumental
operations cannot even be properly evaluated.
The operational point of view considered as a sole
criterion would always favor the low-level abstrac-
tions. However, the most spectacular advances in
theory are connected with the discovery of abstrac-
tions of a very high level.
The constructive aspect of operationalism is ap-
preciated particularly in the process of logical inte-
gration. If we have two theoretical systems, both of
them confirmed by experiment but inconsistent with
66 . W. Bridgman, Daedalus 88, 518 (1959).
each other, we usually find that the inconsistencies
are produced by nonoperational assumptions that
can be dropped without loosing the measure of
experimental agreement already achieved. In fact,
subsequent developments often result in an extra-
ordinary expansion of the range of concordance.
This is what happened as CMP was generalized'
into the dominant RM. Einstein's operational analy-
sis of the concept of simultaneity was a means to an,
end, it made the integration of CMP and CED
possible. The concept of absolute simultaneity was
abandoned because it blocked integration. The fact
that it was not operational showed that this change
in the foundation could be undertaken without
damage.
However, "logical integration" has been, thus far,
not in the vocabulary and the purpose of operational-
ism was not sufficiently appreciated. Erroneously it
was taken for an end in itself, or, an ironical per-
version of its real role, a means to forestall another
"catastrophe" that would force us to re-examine our
basic assumptions.
Although an occasional reappraisal of the founda-
tions may seem a not entirely welcome interruption
of the routine of research work, it is now recognized
to be the unavoidable price to be paid for the con-
tinued use of new high-level abstractions. We again
quote Bridgman: "To me now it seems incompre-
hensible that I should ever have thought it within
my powers, or within the powers of the human race
for that matter, to analyze so thoroughly the func-
tioning of our thinking apparatus that I could
confidently expect to exhaust the subject and elimi-
nate the possibility of a bright new idea against
which I would be defenseless."
We turn now to another difficulty of positivism,
namely, its predominantly restrictive character which
bids us to dismiss most problems of traditional phi-
losophy as "meaningless." Granted that the tradi-
tional methods are lacking in precision, we are faced
with the unhappy choice of dealing with significant
problems in an unsatisfactory manner or bringing to
bear a precise method on problems the wider import
of which is not immediately apparent.
There are at least two ways of breaking this dead-
lock. One could make a case for applying less rigid
standards in appraising intuitive methods, or to ex-
tend the scope of analytic philosophy to more signifi-
cant problems. It is only the second path that will
be followed up at this point.
In order to understand the origin of the restrictive-
ness of positivism, we have to go back to the begin-
nings of mechanistic physics. With the brilliant suc-
_ _ _ __ _ ___
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cess of Newtonian mechanics, it seemed tempting to
brush away the complex and eroded conceptual sys-
tem of scholastic philosophy. The proposition of
temporarily restricting oneself to the conceptual
framework of the new mechanics seems entirely
sound, even in retrospect. However, the contention
'that this conceptual framework would be satisfactory
at all times was unwarranted, and turned out to be
jactually incorrect.
During the mechanistic era it became customary
to dismiss types of questions that did not fit into
mechanistic systems as unscientific.
As the crisis of classical physics revealed the
limitation of the mechanistic conceptual scheme, the
first inference was that the range of legitimate sci-
entific questions is even further limited, since not even
the mechanistic questions are admissible.
The pluralistic character of the present approach
brings two new elements into this picture. In the
first place, each deductive system implies a character-
istic set of precise questions. The number of interest-
ing questions that become "meaningful" is particu-
larly extensive in thermodynamics and quantum
mechanics.
It is often stated that the concept of object breaks
down in quantum mechanics. Actually, however,
the opposite is true. As we have seen in Sec. IV, for
the first time in QM we are in a position to give a
formal representation of an object with many subtle
ramifications and we can now solve the related
philosophical puzzles that have been unresolved
since their discovery by the Eleatic philosophers.
It seems that the new object concept is flexible
enough to include living organisms that are entirely
outside the mechanistic scheme.
The extension of meaningful conceptual problems
in the present context proceeds in still another
dimension. Not only do we have the concepts within
each deductive system, but the deductive systems
themselves are conceptual entities of distinct indi-
vidual characteristics related to each other in quite
specific fashion. These entities are of a logical type
that is markedly different from that of the primitive
concepts within the deductive systems.
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